This is made clear by Russia's maritime blockade of the Ukrainian coast and harbour cities, including the dramatic developments surrounding the export of grain exports of global significance, the ongoing projection of a possible landing of Russian forces from the sea, the use of the Black Sea as an operation and launch area for Russian cruise missiles and the struggle for Snake Island.

It was against this background that we became aware in June when pictures emerged showing a Russian corvette of the Vasily Bykov class (project 22160) with a short-range tactical anti-aircraft missile system of the Tor-M2KM type strapped to the ship's flight deck.

The gate system used weighs around 15 tonnes and is operated by two men. It consists of a module including a radar and firing unit and can be operated independently of the ship's power supply and operations centre. It was striking that the module was kept in the dark olive colour of the land forces and that it was not visually adapted to its maritime environment.

The application is not in itself a sign of deficiency or structural incompetence - you are fighting with the equipment, capabilities and personnel you have, not the ones you would like to have. The fact is that the four active units of the Project 22160 class are equipped as standard with only one launcher for eight 9K338 Igla-S air-to-ground anti-aircraft missiles with a maximum range of around 6 kilometres. The Tor system increases the air defence capability against aircraft, helicopters, drones and missiles to around 15 kilometres with its eight missiles.

The question is rather how sustainable this improvised solution is and whether it actually fulfils its intended purpose. It is quite possible that the air defence system is subject to greater wear and tear in the maritime environment (salt content in water and air) than on land and therefore has to be serviced or even replaced more often, which in turn forces the patrol boat into port more often.

Screenshot of a Tor M2KM system on board the Russian frigate Admiral Grigorovich in October 2016. Source: Defence Blog on YouTube, 2017.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet will not have ordered such an improvisation lightly: Both sides have dealt and taken blows, although it should be noted that Ukraine, as a country without any significant surface forces - but with other maritime capabilities and presumably Western reconnaissance assistance - is clearly punching well above its weight class.

Ever since the sinking of the Russian guided missile cruiser Moskva in April 2022 by Ukrainian Neptune missiles and the permanent loss of Snake Island for Russia at the end of June, Moscow has taken seriously Kiev's maritime capabilities to challenge the Black Sea Fleet in the Black Sea with missiles, drones and its own reconnaissance and command and control assets.

You may also be interested in this article on the Ukraine conflict and the Black Sea:
Drift mines in the Black Sea

Der Beitrag Improvisation im Schwarzen Meer – Landsysteme im maritimen Einsatz erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

According to several media reports, the Russian Ministry of Defence has confirmed that the Russian cruiser "Moskva", the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, sank last night, presumably damaged by at least one Ukrainian "Neptune" missile. While the burning ship was being towed from its last position about 25 miles east of Snake Island to Sevastopol, it lost its "stability" in heavy seas and sank.

Thursday, 14.04.2022, 10:00 a.m.

Just a week ago, NavalNews published a report on the "Moskva" by "Covert Shores" editor H.I. Sutton, in which the ship was portrayed very well in a striking way

see link! www.navalnews.com

Now we are receiving news of serious damage to the "Moskva" by Ukrainian-developed "Neptun" RK-360 sea-target missiles - according to one side. The Russian side speaks of a limited fire on board - as can happen from time to time - you're not in the cargo! As always in these times, there is some truth in the news, but the real picture only becomes recognisable after a certain amount of time.

"Neptun", Ukrainian sea target missile for coastal defence. Photo: official media

The Slava-class weapon carrier

Apart from the initial occupation of Snake Island at the south-western end of Ukrainian territorial waters at the very beginning of the Russian invasion, the "Moskva" did not come to the fore to any great extent. The missile cruisers of the "Slava" class are not equipped for land target fire, but were designed towards the end of the 1970s to combat Western aircraft carriers and their defence groups. Hence the maximum effort with heavyweight SS-N-12B / Sandbox (P-1000 Vulkan, after conversion) sea target FKs in 16 forward-facing launch containers with a range of 450 km (240 nautical miles) at 2.5 times the speed of sound. The FK itself is 12 metres long and weighs around 5 tonnes. The warheads carry an effective charge of approximately 500 kg, which could be equipped with a 350 kiloton nuclear warhead at any time, even if the Black Sea were to be denuclearised. In this sense, the area of deployment was primarily the Mediterranean in addition to the Black Sea.

The battleship

With a length of almost 190 metres and a displacement of almost 12,000 tonnes, such a large battleship is a high-value target in itself and will not venture too far below the enemy coast - with the exception of the pictures of the conquest of the Ukrainian islet, where the ship was probably clearly visible at close range for the purpose of a "show of force". Shore target fire from the forward 130-mm twin turret up to a distance of 22 kilometres (12 nautical miles) is certainly possible (especially with a relatively heavy warhead of 33 kg), but the Grigorovich-class frigates with their modern 100-mm turret on the forecastle also reach this distance - more accurately, but only with half the effective charge.

Tasks in the Black Sea

Nevertheless, a platform of this size in the middle of the Black Sea acts like a spider at the centre of its web - as a lead ship and blockade agent against any surface disruption that might occur there. And with 64 SA-N-6 / Grumble missiles (S-300F / Fort / 8 x 8-fold launcher between the superstructures), it provides an air defence screen capable of reacting over a radius of 100 kilometres between Odessa and Sevastopol. Despite this, the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet kept returning to Sevastopol after a few days - possibly because the Russian leadership, initially confident of victory, only planned short-term deployments, possibly to resupply in the harbour.

What does a possible failure of the "Moskva" mean?

If the news is confirmed and the severity of the damage prevents the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet from manoeuvring freely, this would be a major psychological blow to the Russian naval forces. However, the loss of the "Moskva" would have no influence on the intensity of Russian land target fire with cruise missiles from the sea, which only depends on resupply via Sevastopol or Novorossiysk. It would also not completely thwart amphibious operations, as there are still sufficient units in the Black Sea - despite damage and losses in Berdyansk.

And where are the sister ships?

There is still the question of the two sister ships "Varyag" (Pacific Fleet) and "Marshall Ustinov" (Northern Fleet), which were still in the Mediterranean at the beginning of the war. Since mid-February their trace has been lost on the net - perhaps the comments can help.

Der Beitrag Flaggschiff der Schwarzmeer-Flotte beschädigt und gesunken erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

The media image is dominated by the Russian combat vehicles deployed in a horseshoe shape around eastern Ukraine. [...] Is the current threat posed by Moscow enough to awaken Berlin from its slumber, or will it fall back into old patterns once the crisis is over? How can these security requirements for Germany and Europe be financed against the backdrop of an overstretched defence budget and a strained federal budget? And are these efforts organisationally and fiscally feasible in view of the dramatic demographic development?

In the upcoming budget preparation, Berlin will show how seriously it takes Moscow's sabre-rattling in eastern Ukraine and its own military and security policy capabilities. [...]Talking about what needs to be done now also reveals what has not been done in recent years.

Security is precaution - Commentary on the Russian-Ukrainian crisis. Blog #meerverstehen, 18/02/2022.

Less sparkling wine?

We now know more - including that Chancellor Olaf Scholz is planning a special fund of €100 billion for the Bundeswehr. We will find out what the special fund will ultimately look like in budgetary terms in mid-May, when the budget law is due to be passed by the Bundestag. What the politically organised "shopping list" of the dimensions (formerly the armed forces) will look like at the end of the day is currently an ongoing process in Berlin. Hans-Uwe Mergener has thankfully summarised the wishes and requirements that could arise from the perspective of the German Navy in a current contribution explained.

There is still a lot of water flowing through the Kiel Canal until the politicians decide and the industry delivers the ships and boats ordered. Until then, what is the status of the German Navy's existing and incoming units? We read about the two projects K 130 and F 125 in the 14th Armaments Report of the BMVg:

Corvette class 130, 2nd batch
Range of services

The Class 130 corvettes are a key component of the navy's crisis response operations. Their main tasks are reconnaissance of the surface situation and maritime target engagement. The operational spectrum ranges from peacetime presence and military crisis management tasks to combat in marginal seas and weapons effects on land. The project will be used to procure a further five Class 130 corvette boats.

Significant changes

Boats 6 to 8 are being fitted out in Hamburg. In terms of shipbuilding, the boats are on schedule. The twelve-month "design freeze" for the deployment system requested by the K 130 consortium in September 2020 was implemented in order to ensure the delivery of the boats and the deployment/operational support centre with full functionalities of the deployment system, combined with a delivery delay of two months for boats 6 and 7.

An intensification of the existing risks to the deployment system is possible. The contractual implementation of the delay through the integration of the new framework schedule into an amendment to the construction contract is still pending. In September 2021, the further procedure and the corresponding proposals for the technical solutions were presented as part of a project review. These are now being analysed in detail after the concepts presented in March 2021 for integrating the deployment system and mitigating possible delivery delays in the area of hardware were rejected by the contracting authority (öAG) due to unacceptable timelines.

Project overview

• Development measured against the first parliamentary referral:
  Deviation from the next milestone "start of delivery": +9 months in 2023
  Deviation from the current estimate: € +311 million (+13 per cent)
• Development measured against the current contractual situation:
  Deviation from the next milestone "start of delivery": +2 months in 2023
  Share of performance improvement/change in the above-mentioned deviation: +€191 million (+61 per cent)

Status & development of the project

The K 130 2nd lot project is currently on schedule and within budget in accordance with the contractual basis. The close working relationship between öAG and the K 130 consortium with on-site project management at the headquarters of the K 130 consortium is having a very positive effect on project management. Furthermore, there are signs of a delay due to a delay in performance on the part of the FüWES consortium (KoFü) as part of the integration of the deployment system. It will not be possible to specify this precisely until the end of the fourth quarter of 2021 at the earliest. The öAG's obligations to cooperate, including in the review and approval of the technical documentation, require considerable human resources, which can only be provided in a project-compatible manner with the help of external support. The centre of gravity of the project has now shifted from Lemwerder to Hamburg, with three of the five boats currently being equipped.

 Overall planning categorisation

The Class 130 corvettes are an important operational asset in the context of marginal sea warfare. They are used both to combat sea targets and to provide joint tactical fire support for forces ashore. The additional procurement of five corvettes will help to reduce the individual operational loads of all corvettes and subsequently of the navy. In addition, the greatest possible degree of structural uniformity will reduce the technical, personnel and organisational costs in the areas of training and infrastructure ashore.

In view of the current funding lines, the decision to procure a further five corvettes (boats 11-15 to ensure operational availability while at the same time utilising the first batch) cannot be financed for the time being. In order to fulfil the national ambition of a total of ten corvettes, options for achieving this are now being examined as part of an overall planning consideration, which at the same time do justice to the uninterrupted use of the design status of the current production line of the 2nd batch.

Defence & alliance policy aspects & developments

German naval forces protect the territorial integrity of Germany and its allies. The ability to act at sea is a prerequisite for engagement in crisis management by seagoing forces and for ensuring secure supply routes. In addition, the Class 130 corvette is a key component of the Bundeswehr's international crisis management.

Defence industry aspects & developments
The follow-up procurement K 130 2nd lot expands the Navy's capability portfolio in terms of quantity and, to a limited extent, quality as part of the elimination of obsolescence. By commissioning the K 130 2nd lot, the defence capabilities in national surface warship construction have been consolidated as part of the necessary renewal of the fleet.

Effects on operational readiness

The key to material operational readiness lies in the timely establishment of supply readiness and the implementation of all necessary measures for the accreditation of the IT systems of the entire K 130 class. Failure to establish supply readiness, i.e. permanently restricted logistical operability, will foreseeably have a negative impact on material operational readiness and, like the lack of or restricted accreditation of the IT systems, will significantly restrict the operational usability of the corvettes.

Frigate class 125
Range of services

The Class 125 frigate (F 125) is designed to meet the changing operational requirements of the present and the future. Among other things, the F 125 should be able to carry out worldwide and long-term missions. The main tasks are to carry out maritime stabilisation operations (low and medium intensity), provide tactical fire support from sea to shore, act against asymmetric threats at sea, provide command and control capability at commander level (Commander Task Group [CTG]) and support special forces operations or specialised forces.

Due to the required intensive utilisation (i.e. two years in service; 5,000 operating hours per year; worldwide deployment; operational maintenance period standard [BEPN] 68 months; implementation of a two-crew concept), the maintenance of the ship and the equipment, combined with the requirement for a small crew size, is of great importance and new technical concepts are therefore also required in the area of platform design.

Significant changes

The first ship, the frigate Baden-Württemberg (BWG), began its maintenance work on 6 April 2021 after its first phase of use. This ends on 26/08/2022.

The second ship, frigate North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), was commissioned on 10 June 2020 and ship three, frigate Saxony-Anhalt (SAH), on 17 May 2021.

The delivery date announced by the industry for the fourth and final ship, the frigate Rheinland-Pfalz (RHL), in mid-October 2021 had to be postponed due to the fact that the proofs of functionality had not been completed on several occasions. Delivery in December 2021 is primarily dependent on the fulfilment of the proofs of function, in particular the operational system, as well as a contractual agreement on services still owed and any remaining performance deficits.

Project overview

• Development measured against the first parliamentary referral:
  Deviation from the next "IOC" milestone: +70 months in 2021
  Deviation from the current estimate: + € 1.117 billion (+51 per cent)
• Development measured against the current contractual situation:
  Deviation from the next "IOC" milestone: +15 months in 2021
  Share of performance improvement/change in the above-mentioned deviation: + € 355 million (+32 per cent)

Status & development of the project

The delivery of ship 4, which is expected in December 2021, is highly risky due to outstanding evidence in the deployment system, the follow-up and rectification of all outstanding technical, commercial and contractual performance deficits as well as still outstanding contracts to establish operational readiness.

The scheduling, which is dominated by the block formation of measures, foreseeably reduces the possibilities of qualifying crews for deployment purposes.

 Overall planning categorisation

With the acceptance of the fourth and final ship, planned for this year, the capability build-up of the weapon system is progressing steadily. Due to the remaining limitations in the operational system and information security as well as the lack of operational testing (127mm artillery and missile firing), operational use will not be possible until 2023. From a planning perspective, the prompt elimination of these deficits has the highest priority in order to make the four units operationally available as quickly as possible.

Defence & alliance policy aspects & developments

Naval forces make a permanent contribution to maritime security in national and multinational organisations. The Class 125 frigate provides greater room for manoeuvre in terms of defence policy to counter crises and conflicts worldwide at their point of origin in order to prevent further escalation at an early stage. In addition, Germany is making an essential and visible contribution to the permanent NATO naval organisations with the F 125.

Defence industry aspects & developments

In addition to expanding the navy's range of capabilities, the F 125 offers the opportunity to demonstrate the technological capabilities of the German shipbuilding industry. Challenges exist for ship-based IT systems and their accreditation. The ongoing digitalisation of naval shipbuilding is creating a new development focus for the companies involved in the marketing of their products and their commercial success.

Effects on operational readiness

The key to material operational readiness lies in establishing supply readiness and implementing all necessary measures to accredit the IT systems of the Class 125 frigates. Failure to establish supply readiness, i.e. permanently restricted logistical operability, will foreseeably have a negative impact on material operational readiness and, like a lack of or restricted accreditation of the IT systems, will restrict the operational usability of the frigates.

Der Beitrag 14. Rüstungsbericht – K 130 & F 125 im Fokus erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

Moscow's global naval ballet

Large amphibious landing ship "Ropucha" class, photo: Russian Navy

The Russian news agency Tass reported on 20 January, citing the Moscow Ministry of Defence, that the Russian Navy will conduct a series of naval exercises in all 'areas of responsibility of the fleets' in January and February. The exercises are related to the training plan for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for 2022, which was finalised during a collegial meeting of the Defence Council in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief, President Vladimir Putin, in December 2021. The naval exercises scheduled in all sea areas worldwide, including the Arctic, will be led by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Nikolai Anatolyevich Yevmenov. According to him, it is planned that more than 140 warships and auxiliary vessels, more than 60 aircraft and a total of around 10,000 men will take part. Including the logistical and ground support units of the navy and the coastal defence forces, around 1,000 units will be deployed.

"Admiral Kasatonov" of the Gorshkov class, photo: Russian Navy

Is this just a rather coincidental coincidence with the intensification of the Ukraine crisis? Or is this exactly what was intended? The leadership of the Russian armed forces has a keen understanding of staging. The Black Sea serves as a suitable stage set for this. Since the end of the Cold War, the region has become a strategic zone in Europe, on the edges of which several conflicts have been fought out militarily. It became the scene of the smouldering crisis over Crimea and the Donbass. Older conflicts such as those in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Moldova are currently on ice. The strategic role for Moscow is obvious: on the one hand, the Black Sea is the wet southern flank of Russia's own claimed foreland, which it needs to control. On the other hand, in order to have a say in the Mediterranean, Russia needs a benevolent Turkey that controls access there. This is one reason for the flirtations between Moscow and Ankara.

Russia will always lag behind the US presence in the Mediterranean - both quantitatively and qualitatively. A glance at the bases of the two world powers in the Mediterranean alone makes this clear. The Russian base in Tartus (Syria) cannot compete with the capabilities of the US Navy in Naples and Souda Bay (Crete).

Kamov Ka-27 helicopter landing, photo: Russian Navy

According to the Moscow Ministry of Defence, the aim of the inter-army exercises that Russia has now scheduled is to "protect Russian territory and national interests on the world's oceans and to counter military threats to the Russian Federation from the sea". The navy explicitly refers to the involvement of the aerospace forces.

For long-time observers, announcements of large-scale exercises are nothing new. Manoeuvres such as "OKEAN", "ZAPAD 81", "Waffenbrüderschaft" (on a smaller scale) or "DRUŽBA" stood for Cold War scenarios.

Back in January, the Russian Northern Fleet began exercises to deal with "crisis situations in the Arctic Ocean region". It was officially announced that up to 30 ships and submarines of the Northern Fleet, 20 aircraft and the Arctic Expeditionary Corps were involved in the exercises. Even the Kirov-class battlecruiser "Pyotr Velikiy" was involved at times. The Udaloy-class destroyer "Severomorsk", the Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate "Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov" and the landing ship "Ivan Gren" were also involved.

Der Beitrag Zu den russischen Marineaktivitäten - nicht nur im Schwarzen Meer erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

It was the army's first major foreign deployment, which came to an abrupt end when the USA withdrew hastily from the operation and the German troops were left to fend for themselves.

The circumstances of the subsequent Southern Cross evacuation operation were widely discussed at the time. However, if you want to read up on this today, you will only find a single Wikipedia article (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Southern_Cross), which was based on the reports of the then Marine-The operation has long been forgotten. This operation has long since been forgotten, overshadowed by more recent missions and, in recent years, a return to national and alliance defence.

What are the lessons learnt from Mogadishu? Firstly, the operation was characterised by the lack of a Bundeswehr command organisation for such missions. There was no organisation that was able to manage the confusion of competencies, the disputes and, above all, the jealousies of the various branches of the armed forces and lead all forces operationally. This provided the impetus to set up the Operational Command a few years later

On the other hand, it became apparent that the Marine simply lacked the appropriate ships to move army troops. At that time, frigates and a supply ship were used as transports. The small SeaLynx helicopters flew out the last contingent completely, a masterpiece of improvisation, but in principle an indictment of poverty.

The Inspector General at the time therefore called for a so-called multi-purpose ship, which in other countries would simply have been called a dock landing ship. The idea behind this so-called Naumann Ark was to be able to bring troops ashore and back again independently of harbours and provide them with logistical support. This primarily required amphibious ships, which would also have been ideal platforms for humanitarian aid operations.

The resulting opportunities have been Marine in its concept for supporting joint operations from the sea (Basis See). Although the Bundeswehr could have made good use of such a capacity in the phase of major foreign deployments that began after Mogadishu, the initiative failed. The same happened to two other attempts, which were organised under the names Einsatztruppenunterstützungsschiff (ETrUS) and Joint Support Ship (JSS) have gone down in history.

The only thing that has been achieved is a co-operation agreement with the Netherlands on the joint use of their landing ship Karel Doorman. There is also the ARC agreement with Denmark on joint transport with merchant ships.

Since the Crimean invasion at the latest, attention has turned to other naval projects. Now the focus is once again on powerful surface ships and submarines, submarine hunters and new mine defences.

However, if you read official documents such as the 2016 White Paper, you will find that international crisis management is on a par with national and alliance defence. This means that foreign missions have not disappeared, the requirements for them still exist.

25 years after Mogadishu, a quarter of a century after Operation Southern Cross, it is therefore time to take stock. What was it like back then, and what lessons are still relevant today? To do this, however, and this is the third lesson, you need good documentation and an unbiased evaluation of what worked and what did not.

Der Beitrag #meerverstehen: 25 Jahre nach Mogadischu - was bleibt? erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

On 3 February 2017, the Norwegian government announced that Germany, and not France, had been selected as the strategic partner for the submarine project to ensure the succession of the ULA class. The aim of the decision is the joint procurement and "lifetime management" of identical new submarines based on the German Class 212A, according to the statement from the Ministry of Defence.

The following bilateral negotiations with the aim of reaching an intergovernmental agreement will focus on determining the proportionate involvement of the respective national defence industries for the four Norwegian and two German boats to be delivered in the second half of the 2020s, reaching agreements on cooperation between the navies and official bodies of both countries and defining Germany's role as the "lead nation". Only then will negotiations with the Kiel-based submarine shipyard tkMS begin in order to finalise the technical and financial aspects of the winning bid against the state-owned DCNS shipyard to such an extent that the construction contract can be concluded in 2019. Before then - next spring - the government intends to "finalise the investment project Neue Submarines" to Parliament "as a strategic capability", which presumably means inclusion in the defence budget.

Immediately after the news was announced, DCNS, which was victorious against the Germans in Australia in April 2016, wrote in a press release that it regretted but respected the sovereign decision and was prepared to re-enter the market if the German-Norwegian negotiations failed. It was also convinced that its offer (a further developed "New SCORPENE") was the superior one, particularly in the area of submarine hunting, which was decisive for the far north.

Since the 1960s, Norway has had a total of 21 Submarines in Kiel and Emden, more than any other nation, but Oslo's decision in favour of the Germans was not a foregone conclusion. When only DCNS and tkMS remained in the final shortlist for the competition from April 2016 - South Korea, Italy, Sweden and Spain had previously been eliminated - the French went all out. Australia has shown how this can turn out. Lessons learnt down under were certainly not insignificant, but Norway is different. Technology, price, export experience, parent-navy support, political tailwind, excellent PR strategy, official and industrial approach from a single mould, etc...all of this was obviously right this time and this success has - like everyone - many fathers. The final efforts of the two rivals show just how close the race was in the home straight. The French organised an industry day in Oslo on 6 December 2016 in collaboration with the Norwegian Procurement Institute FSI, which was attended by all the big company names - and the press release from DCNS already reads like a proclamation of victory. The Germans literally countered "quietly": on 11 December, they sent the best and most modern thing they had up the Oslo Fjord: "Das Boot", in the form of the recently commissioned U36. The newspapers and blogs reported step by step how the "tysk ubåt 212A" to the capital, where it then served as an authentic backdrop for the official press conference on the submarine project. PR at its best!

What circumstances were decisive in the end for the victory of the design called U212NG according to informed circles?

It can be assumed that there was a clear willingness to generously accommodate the Norwegian industry (mainly Kongsberg) in its expectation of maximising its own system shares, even to the detriment of its own manufacturers. Here, the German ATLAS Elektronik in particular will have to forego the implementation of its FüWES ISUS and accept Kongsberg's MSI as the default (as was the case with the first batch at the time). 212A). The French are even likely to have offered know-how sharing in the missile area (FK), possibly for the still outstanding "submarinisation" of Kongsberg's "Naval Strike Missile" (NSM), but have shown little interest in purchasing this FK beyond that. The Germans, on the other hand, will ultimately have no choice but to procure large quantities of the NSM as a land-attack-capable naval target armament for their own two U212NGs and also for their surface units (possibly as a replacement for Harpoon). Perhaps this concession will ultimately be less a sacrifice on the altar of co-operation and more a good solution to the German Navy's missile problems.

Another point is speculative: DCNS went public in the summer of 2016, just in time for the Euronaval defence trade fair, with the announcement that it had developed a "fuel cell 2nd generation" (FC-2G) that works with nitrogen-enriched oxygen - in other words, breathing air - in combination with a diesel reformer, ready for use. This would not only eliminate the current German unique selling point of the "fuel cell AIP", but in future it would also be possible to generate the reactant hydrogen on board from the diesel fuel that is already carried in abundance. If it were not for the requirement of an absolutely sulphur-free, difficult to procure on the market, high-priced diesel for the highly complex, inefficient and signature-deteriorating (due to CO₂As this author knows from corresponding studies, this would be a space-consuming reformer process; regular diesel fuel is therefore ruled out. HDW and later tkMS therefore focussed on the development of a methanol reformer years ago. With their "New SCORPENE", the French certainly offered the above-mentioned combination as an AIP. tkMS and the German authorities could have made the Norwegians aware of the hitch in this solution, backed it up with their own test results and thus damaged the opponent. Especially since such a system has not yet demonstrated one of the competition's criteria - operational suitability ("proven design").

Last but not least, the German intention to procure two identical boats for the "parent navy" may have been the final breakthrough. This presumably means the construction of the type boat ("first of class") for the German Navy and thus the commitment to act as "lead nation". A more efficient risk reduction over the entire course of the project for the - as rumoured - ambitious and costly design is inconceivable. The French were unable to match this, as they maintain an exclusively nuclear-powered submarine weapon and only build conventional submarines for export.

What is U212NG?

Nothing is known about the design in open sources, not even a rough sketch, no technical data and certainly no price tag. The German design philosophy of "as small as possible and as big as necessary" has not worked in Australia compared to the "think big" mantra. Even the derivation of the tkMS range from a "premium design", which was appreciated by the Norwegians U212A for the German Navy suggests that the U212NG remained true to this philosophy. However, the year 2017 has different requirements than the year 1987, when U212 was first designed. Since 2008 at the latest, when the frigate Bayern achieved spectacular detection ranges against the extremely small U206A in the Bay of Biscay with the low-frequency, active towed sonar LFTAS, the reduction and optimisation of the target echo strength (TES) has been a must for every modern design, whereby coating is ineffective against the low-frequency and thus long-wave sonar radiation, but structural shaping (acoustic mirroring) is required.

The Germans will insist on their proven amagnetic design, the signature reduction also includes a low snorkelling rate and thus a second diesel engine, which makes the U212A The constriction characterising the rear pressure vessel has been eliminated. As the methanol reformer is not "proven", the metal hydride storage for hydrogen will probably remain, but with a larger capacity. For the Arctic region, the Norwegians will insist on a drastic increase in both the regular and AIP driving range, i.e. significantly increased diesel and liquid oxygen supplies. Two pressurised compartments and appropriate docking facilities for the NATO Submarine Rescue System (NSRS), of which Norway is one of the operators, are likely to be required. These parameters will significantly increase the size of the boat and therefore also require a more powerful propulsion engine. Lithium-ion batteries with significantly improved energy density will replace the lead-acid technology that has been tried and tested for over 100 years, which, in addition to many operational advantages, will result in an up to four-fold increase in discharge time at maximum speed, for example. In terms of dimensions, all this means an estimated 10 metre extension, an increased pressure hull diameter and an increased displacement of around 2,000 tonnes. It can be assumed that the U212NG with IDAS will be able to defend itself against flying tormentors, and that the cooperation with Norway and Germany will be a success. Submarines should finally result in a sea target FK has already been discussed above.

Implications

The German Navy is coming for a 7th and 8th visit. Submarinewhich the majority of their senior decision-makers, who are characterised by surface warfare, will only be very slow to rejoice about - if at all - and certainly not the budget holders. Although an increase in the defence budget is no longer taboo "thanks" to the Putin and Trump effect, the shipbuilding sector will have great difficulty coping with several major projects in parallel over the next 10 years; keywords: corvettes, MK180, fleet tankers. However, if the Dutch and possibly even the Poles join the German-Norwegian submarine project (as expressly hoped for in the Norwegian declaration quoted at the beginning), then there will be no turning back for Berlin. Malicious tongues claim that this is the only reason why Germany still has Submarinesbecause its submarine industry is one of the key defence technologies. And indeed, this project creates the new national technological reference it needs to continue to be the world market leader in non-nuclear submarine construction. In this respect, the Australian defeat was a painful but bearable slip-up, because nobody else needs a "leviathan" like the SHORTFIN BARRACUDA - a U212NG, on the other hand, has what it takes to become the new international benchmark and will secure the competitiveness of the Kiel shipyard and its suppliers well into the 2030s. The announcement of the submarine cooperation has already signalled a willingness to strengthen the alliance's northern flank and fits into the landscape. It is time for the German Navy - and above all the politicians - to realise what strategic potential Germany has with its submarine weapon.

The original article appears in the current issue of the magazine of the Verband Deutscher Ubootfahrer (VdU), "Emergence"

Der Beitrag #meerverstehen: Norwegen setzt bei U-Booten erneut auf Deutschland erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

This blog entry is not intended to be a review of the study, but rather to highlight some aspects of relevance to the German capability for underwater warfare and place them in the context of today's German Navy. Insight deficits - if they are recognisable - are due to the distance of the retired author. A translation of the "Executive Summary" provides the reader in a hurry with the essentials of the work:

"Russia is expanding its underwater deployments as part of a broader strategy of coercion against its neighbours, NATO and the United States. Russia has a long history of expanding its maritime capabilities for strategic signalling purposes, including the use of targeted provocations. Suspected intrusions into territorial waters in the Baltic Sea and provocative operations in the North Atlantic have caused alarm among NATO and partner nations, particularly as they have highlighted the extent to which NATO and its regional partners' submarine hunting capabilities have diminished since the end of the Cold War.

The Russian Navy and its submarine force have been largely unaffected by the economic and manpower challenges posed by Russia's extensive military modernisation efforts. Moscow has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to developing and maintaining its submarine-based strategic deterrent and has prioritised areas such as non-nuclear submarine capabilities, certain surface naval capabilities and long-range ship-to-ship missiles against carrier battle groups. Therefore, Russian submarines are generally considered to be very capable platforms if they are properly maintained. In Northern Europe, the use of Russian submarines to signal presence, reach and power goes far beyond the resource approach.

In large parts of the North Atlantic and in the Baltic Sea, NATO and its partner nations do not currently have the means to meet the Russian underwater challenge in the short term. This is not only due to diminishing capabilities, but equally problematic is the lack of integration between the relevant allies and partners. Effective submarine hunting capabilities require a joint alliance approach that integrates and coordinates national and NATO platforms, sensors and personnel. These integrated capabilities need to be underpinned by a coherent doctrine and exercised regularly to ensure real capability at both national and alliance level.

In view of competing priorities, tight defence budgets and interface problems in the European defence sector between NATO members and the important partner countries Sweden and Finland, organisational reforms coupled with a joint alliance approach to capability development and fine-tuning are needed to get the rebuilding of American and European submarine warfare capabilities underway. To counter Russian underwater activities, the study makes the following recommendations in the concluding chapter 4:

1. Preparation of organisational structuresRelying exclusively on NATO structures could prove to be the wrong approach in terms of effectively utilising partner capabilities and expertise. Together with the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), NATO could act as a bridge to promote interoperability and the combined level of performance. A centre of excellence focused on submarine warfare could also be useful as a hub for research, planning, doctrine development, lessons learned and the rebuilding and integration of undersea warfare capabilities.
2. Bringing skills up to dateTo develop a system that is effective against new and emerging technologies, NATO and its partners need to build a multi-domain, multi-platform and maritime surveillance complex, ideally in a joint alliance construct that prioritises payloads over platforms. The specific recommendations of this study bring together different sensors and strike capabilities based on small and large, manned and unmanned, space-based, airborne, surface and submarine platforms.
3. Improve the overall postureNATO can optimise its overall submarine force posture to ensure the right capabilities are deployed in the right place at the right time when it reopens Kevlavik Naval Air Station in Iceland and encourages Norway to do the same with the Submarine Support Facility in Olavsvern.

The organisations, relationships, intelligence and capabilities that once made up the robust submarine hunting network in the North Atlantic and Baltic no longer exist. It represents a critical step in a joint alliance approach to meet the 21st century challenge posed by Russia's undersea forces in the region and to prevent Russian maritime coercion against the United States, NATO and key European partners."

In chapter 3 "Meeting the Russsian Challenge"The study analyses the strategic priorities of NATO and its partners, takes a detailed look at the capabilities of the countries (DAN, FRA, FIN, DEU, NDL, NOR, POL, SWE, GBR, USA) and uses tables to show the diminished potential of the individual navies. Germany is described as representative for Europe:

"The German Navy is representative of the ASW capabilities resident in several relevant European nations. For the past fifteen years, NATO has emphasised its operations in Afghanistan. In response, the German Navy moved away from investing in capabilities needed for territorial defence. Therefore, the latest class of German surface combatant, the F125-class, has little to no ASW capabilities.

This surface fleet shortfall is partially offset by the excellence of the German submarine fleet. The Type 212 submarines, the product of a joint development programme with Italy, are some of the most advanced air independent propulsion (AIP) submarines in the world. Their exceptional stealth, long submerged endurance, and small size makes them ideal for shallow water and littoral operations. While they would seemingly excel in Baltic Sea operations, it is unclear to what extent the German submarine force operates in these waters.

Notably, however, these vessels have no land attack capability. In fact, the German Navy does not possess any form of long-range land attack weapon for either surface or subsurface vessels. There are understandable political sensitivities around the acquisition of such capabilities by the German Navy. However, given the current security environment in Europe and beyond, a limited investment into these systems may be prudent."

Although the German U212A is considered one of the "most advanced AIP submarines in the world" is duly honoured, yet in the passage about Sweden, the A26 under construction receives the more important (advance) laurels for the study's concern when it says: "The new A26 vessels will be a step change in terms of multi-mission capability...The A26 will also use Stirling engines vice fuel cells, eliminate the day's long fueling process, and boast a flexible payload capacity..." This labels the German unique selling point "fuel cell AIP" as a disadvantage compared to the Swedish Stirling solution and conceals the fact that the fuel cell has an unsurpassed favourable acoustic signature, several times higher efficiency and a much smaller footprint.

Nevertheless, in this author's opinion, the study refrained from criticising German deficits and omitted, for example, the on-board helicopter plight. She correctly surmises that U212A "would seemingly excel in the Baltic Sea operations", but remains vague with the statement that "it is unclear to what extent the German submarine force operates in these waters". The fact that this former playground of the German submarine force will probably have to remain orphaned due to the lamentable lack of personnel and material in the force, which has been reduced from 24 to 6 units, is probably left unmentioned out of tact. The fact that U212A was reduced to the role of a pure torpedo carrier as a high-value submarine platform and does not have a "flexible payload capacity", especially not about missiles and certainly not about missiles for use on land (land attack), is indeed a remarkable deficit, which may have to do with the fact that German submarines are at best seen as tactical-operational, but not as strategic naval warfare assets. In contrast, almost all German export submarines were at least armed with the American Sub-Harpoon by their respective navies.

Fading out the land-attack-In the case of the RBS15 missile for the K130 corvette, which is capable (but not yet operational), the study states that "in fact the German Navy does not possess any form of long-range land attack weapon for either surface or subsurface vessels". The fact that Germany also considered it sufficient to soon remove its over 7,000 tonnes of Frigates class 125 with "little to no ASW capabilities" into service is not left unmentioned in the study, but it does not explicitly brand this unique selling point, which is also unique worldwide. Presumably due to a lack of corresponding input, however, the study fails to mention a further major coup in terms of German undersea warfare capabilities: LFTAS, the "Low Frequency Active Towed Array Sonar", which, after years of testing, was launched in 2008 at the Frigate the class 123 "Bayern" had successfully passed the operational capability test and achieved maximum detection ranges previously considered impossible, even against small conventional submarines. As part of the "Capability Adaptation" project F123", the navy was not in a position to equip this premium localisation tool due to other financial priorities. This class of ship, originally planned as a "submarine hunting frigate", will therefore remain a "submarine hunting torso" until its foreseeable end of life. The fact that the single LFTAS on the defence research vessel "Planet" continues to operate in cooperation with submarines and is doing excellent work in the further development of multistatic underwater detection should be mentioned here, but does not help the German Navy out of its submarine-hunting misery. The old navy saying proves true here too: "Everywhere you scratch, the blue cloth comes out.

Two recommendations from Chapter 4 of the study are worthy of note from the author's point of view:

"Recommendation: Integrate Interoperable Land Attack Weapons on all NATO and Partner Nations' Submarines

Several nations have been unwilling to integrate land attack cruise missiles into their naval force for political reasons. Given current gaps in precision-guided munitions across allied surface and subsurface fleets, NATO and Sweden should refit their submarine forces to be capable of employing Tomahawk (or equivalent) land attack weapons. Land attack capability should also be a key requirement for all future allied and partner submarines.

Desired effect: Allows submarines to strike targets with less counterforce risk than land-based systems, bringing powerful deterrent value."

As quoted above, the study shows understanding for Germany's "understandable political sensitivities around the acquisition of such capabilities by the German Navy". In addition to political sensitivities (as is currently the case with the defence minister's failed attempt to justify armed drones), the navy has notorious problems even allowing its submarines to operate missiles, let alone providing budget funds for them. This is evidenced by the development failure of the submarine-based IDAS missile, which has a modest range of 20 km and is capable of helicopter defence as well as limited action on land. Just thinking about Tomahawk is therefore probably on the mental index of naval and submarine officers.

"Recommendation: Institutionalise and Further Develop a Unified Submarine Command, Weapons, and Tactics Course

The UK's submarine pre-command school, colloquially known as 'Perisher' because of its high standards and associated high failure rate, is attended by officers from several NATO nations. NATO should develop a short-form Perisher-style course for allies and partners, perhaps within the context of the ASW COE. Due to equipment differences, this course would not supplant national training for commanders (especially those representing more advanced undersea navies), but it will help promote integration among NATO navies, improve that ability of the NATO submarine force to operate in a combined manner, alleviate some of the burden of maintaining a robust training pipeline for nations with small submarine forces, and create a common baseline among those countries with more nascent capabilities. A unified pre-command course will also be important as the navies of the various NATO member states acquire new undersea warfare capabilities."

If there were any doubts as to whether Germans were involved in this study, they have been wiped away with this passage, because there is no mention of the German Submarine Training Centre (AZU). Although not clouded by the legendary myth of the British "Perisher", it has been training submarine commander candidates from NATO and non-NATO states for many years and is in no way inferior to the "Perisher" in terms of quality and standards. Furthermore, because the British only maintain nuclear-powered submarines in their own navy, the author doubts that their training courses can be transferred 1:1 to conventional submarines.

In view of the fact that Germany, with its recognised expertise in naval border warfare, was awarded the contract for the stationing of the NATO "Centre of Excellence for Confined and Shallow Waters" (COE CSW), was a formidable opponent of the Warsaw Pact in the Baltic Sea during the Cold War and, despite all the reductions, is still one of the stronger navies in Northern Europe, it is surprising that it was not actively involved in this study. Was a corresponding enquiry rejected, was there no institute that was deemed worthy of contributing? If one assumes conspiracy, especially with regard to the Swedish industrial sponsor, one is tempted to suspect intent. In 2014, the Kiel-based submarine shipyard tkMS/HDW parted ways with its Swedish subsidiary Kockums in disagreement - the Swedish state pursued the separation with all its might, as it had the greatest interest in pushing ahead with the ailing A26 submarine project on a purely national basis without German dependencies. Saab was more than happy to take over the broken pieces of the traditional Kockums submarine shipyard and, above all, its highly qualified personnel. Following Germany's defeat in the Australian submarine competition and with a view to the competition for Norway's new submarines, which will be decided in the next two years, there are interests that are interested in weakening the current German world market leader in non-nuclear submarine construction - including its "parent navy" - might have been located. It is striking that the study claims in the section on the Netherlands "[they] may be partnering with Sweden on submarine development and production" and that Poland "may be looking at a Swedish designed vessel". Honi soit qui mal y pense...

Der Beitrag #meerverstehen: Neue US-Studie zum Unterwasserseekrieg in Nordeuropa erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

So the next time you're waiting for a train that doesn't run or a plane that doesn't fly, make the most of the time and take a look at Wild wave!

Wild wave is a book that belongs on the bedside table of anyone who feels a connection to seafaring or simply to the adventures of this world. It is particularly easy to read in stages - the 18 captains' stories are self-contained. They include human and technical disasters, adventures in the South Seas on a submarine supply ship during the Second World War and the sinking of a crab fisherman off Alaska. The reader can also experience the human and technical pitfalls involved in ferrying a car ferry from North Friesland to Thailand (!).

Axel Prahl has shown a happy hand in selecting the stories and his summarising comments at the beginning of the stories set the mood and make it difficult to put the book down. However, this may also be due to the ingenious feel of the book - the soft paper and excellent printing make it considerably more difficult to put down. People who love books have put a lot of thought into this book!

Our conclusion: We find Wild wave entertaining, exciting, tanned by weather, wind and sea and spiked with a pinch of machine oil! The short stories invite you to pick up the book again and again or to read it in one go. The reader does not have to have been to sea himself to be fascinated.

What we particularly like: The publishing house with a heart for anchors manages to be enthusiastic about the coast, the sea and the people who live and work with them without coming across as old-fashioned or folksy - we certainly like the slightly punky image!

Axel Prahl presented:
Wild wave. The best stories of old captains
Ankerherz publishing house, Hollenstedt 2014
Available here, directly from the publisher

Der Beitrag Maritimes zum Schmökern - Wilde Welle erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

A century at sea?
by Lieutenant Captain Mark Baumert

The 21st century has recently been predicted to be the century of Asia and the emerging markets, the century of increasing digitalisation of our everyday lives and the century of renewable energies, to name just three examples. Predictions such as these are now recognised by society as a whole and are often accepted as a guiding forecast, whether in the area of investment or the orientation of companies. However, forecasts of supposedly significant developments are also characterised by the profession and world view of the forecaster. For example, the Institute for Applied Physics at the University of Bonn expects a "century of the photon", the Bavarian State Women's Committee hopes for a "century of women" and the Heiligenfeld Academy in Bad Kissingen, a spiritual training centre with the aim of "expanding consciousness" and "personal growth", expects a "century of consciousness".

A century with many names.

Wishful thinking or ambassador of reality?

For some time now, maritime trade journals, conferences on maritime topics and individual articles in national daily newspapers have stated that the increasing foreign trade of the Federal Republic of Germany has been accompanied by a change in the importance of maritime shipping and its security. Here, too, there is talk of a century, namely the "maritime 21st century". Although this economic sector has always been important for Germany's development anyway, it will become even more significant as a result of the ever-increasing globalisation and export orientation of German companies. In the same breath, as recently emphasised in the article "No land in sight?" in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung by the group of authors Vice Admiral (ret.) Feldt, Vice Admiral (ret.) Stricker, Prof. Dr Masala, Tsetsos M.A. states that in Germany there is only a marginal interest in this essential economic sector and thus in matters of maritime security policy.

But isn't the maritime industry and the German Navy perhaps also subject to the compulsion to secure its own existence in the competition for public funding? And does this perhaps narrow the perspective on maritime issues? Or do the experts in this sector paint a more accurate picture, namely that of a maritime 21st century that is actually taking place, especially for the Federal Republic of Germany?

Challenges of the maritime economy

Let us first consider the economic importance of the maritime sector for the Federal Republic of Germany: several hundred thousand employees, a rapidly growing tourism industry, a high level of German financial capital in international maritime shipping and an undoubtedly important economic sector for Germany's foreign trade. But what is the current state of the industry? Is this industry fit for the future?

How from the Third Report of the Federal Government on the Development and Future Prospects of the Maritime Industry in Germany February/2013 The last few years have been changeable and difficult for the global economy, but especially for the German maritime industry. In the years leading up to the global economic crisis until the end of 2008, the maritime sector was characterised by high order numbers, shipping was characterised by high demand for shipping space and, in the container sector in particular, high freight and charter rates meant that handling records were set in some cases. With the subsequent economic slump in 2009 due to the global economic and financial crisis, the positive key figures for the maritime sector in particular also declined. As the maritime industry is tied to the global economy to a much greater extent than other sectors due to its inherent international orientation, this slump in 2009 also led to a massive decline in demand for shipping space and orders for new ships.

Although there was an unexpectedly strong recovery in 2010, turnover in the maritime industry fell again in 2011 and 2012. As numerous new ships were ordered during the "boom years", part of the global merchant fleet is now unemployed. Based on 4961 full container ships operating worldwide and a total global transport capacity of 16.4 million TEU, this means that at the end of 2012, a high volume of 810,000 TEU remained unutilised compared to previous years. In addition, the order situation in container shipbuilding remains at a low level due to enormous overcapacity in Asia. However, shipyards in Germany have been able to hold their own in the market, largely by switching from container shipbuilding to specialised shipbuilding. Offshore wind energy and the associated infrastructural measures as well as the cruise ship industry also offer good growth figures in the German maritime industry.

Overall, it can be stated that the maritime industry in Germany has taken on the challenges of the present despite volatile and rough seas and has positioned itself well in a global comparison. However, this does not apply to the entire industry. The situation for shipbuilding suppliers, especially for those suppliers that are heavily dependent on standard ship newbuilds, remains difficult in the medium term.

Mineral resources, shipping routes and world trade

Although world trade is currently stagnating, not least due to the euro crisis, it can be assumed that the trend towards more international trade will continue in the future as globalisation increases. And this is largely based on maritime logistics. The international division of labour and production is also increasing. But it is not only world trade that will increase; conflicts over marine resources will also continue to intensify. In East Asia, for example, China's increasing influence in the region - the conflict over the South China Sea is just one example - is forcing neighbouring countries to upgrade their navies in particular. For countries such as China, Japan, the Philippines and South Korea, the surrounding sea is essential and securing their shipping routes and seabed resources is of great importance. The maritime space between these countries will continue to harbour potential for conflict in the future. But not only here, all over the world the sea is seen as an exploitable resource area, a place for offshore constructions and an area of controllable shipping routes.

The seabed of the Arctic, actually a place far removed from world events, has also increasingly become an object of desire in recent years. Due to the melting ice and new findings about the resources available there, claims are being made public through media-effective symbolic politics, such as Russia placing a national flag on the Arctic floor. The neighbouring states no longer accept the status quo of territorial distribution and, similar to the South China Sea, are using outlandish legal constructs based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to assert their territorial claims. The desire to be independent of oil and gas imports and possibly even to be able to export them is capable of turning the Arctic Council, which was actually founded in 1996 for the peaceful exploration and monitoring of the Arctic, into a political discussion forum for territorial claims.

Safe shipping routes form the backbone of functioning global trade. However, these are often impaired by armed conflicts between states, asymmetric adversaries or, in particular, piracy. Those who immediately think of Somalia are not wrong, but piracy also plays a role in other parts of the world. There has recently been a growing number of voices pointing out that piracy in West Africa has increased outside the media spotlight and is also a threat to European shipping. France, which continues to view this region as its "backyard" with particular attention, has been involved in maritime operations there since 1990. Mission Corymbe represented. However, the fight against piracy is only a by-product of this mission; it is more about representation, maintaining influence and a quick evacuation option for French citizens in West Africa. In contrast to the East African coast, the pirates here are not facing any coordinated resistance from the international community.

Meanwhile, the cross-border smuggling of people by sea continues unabated. In Europe in particular, despite joint efforts and the establishment of the European Border Guard and Coordination Centre FRONTEX continues to be a major problem. On the one hand, illegal immigration harbours many economic problems for the countries concerned, in Europe primarily for Spain, Italy and Greece. On the other hand, the risks for the "travellers" are often life-threatening. Miserably dying of thirst at sea in overcrowded wooden boats is often the end of the dream of a future in Europe. And despite the crisis, more and more people are dreaming of this future.

As it turns out, the challenges at sea have not diminished in recent years.

How is Germany reacting to these developments?

Have these developments been recognised as such by those responsible in our country? Let us first look at coastal defence. Although the call for a unified national coastguard in Germany has not abated, no progress has been made since the agreement in the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition agreement in 2009 due to a lack of willingness to hand over competences. On the plus side, however, at least the establishment of the Maritime Security Centre in Cuxhaven in 2007 has created a single office where the necessary coordination can take place between a large number of maritime authorities involved. Nevertheless, there is already a problem here at national level that has been an "old acquaintance" at European level in the area of security policy for years: no standardised management with low efficiency and a cost-driving level of duplication. Overall, this is unsatisfactory, as there are no highly complex challenges standing in the way of a solution to this problem, but rather an influence-orientated wrangling over competencies at ministerial level.

The German Navy, on the other hand, like all other branches of the Bundeswehr, has undergone an enormous process of change in recent years as part of the Bundeswehr reform. Command structures and responsibilities of the German Navy have been concentrated and a modernisation process unprecedented in its recent history has been initiated through the decommissioning of old platforms and the arrival of new units, such as the K130 corvettes, the 212A submarines (Lot 2), the third task force provider and the start of construction of the future Baden-Württemberg-class frigates. The end result should be a more effective, ultimately modern navy that is managed without structural duplication and which, while not comparable in scope to the navies of Great Britain, France or the USA, will continue to be characterised by high quality in the areas of its expertise.

Compared to the other TSKs of the Bundeswehr, the German Navy was also able to adopt the new command structure comparatively quickly, particularly in the form of the new naval command in Rostock. Even if, all in all, the initiated change process is in full swing and new procedures have to prove themselves, the German Navy appears to be structurally well on the way to being able to adequately meet the challenges of the 21st century. European co-operation can also be intensified. This year, for example, the German Armed Forces will be organising a Letter of Intent The German and Dutch navies are expected to enter into a greater partnership with the Netherlands. This could also lead to greater links between the German and Dutch navies.

What about the neighbour's garden?

In the area of security policy, particularly within NATO and the EU, numerous countries are being forced to reduce their maritime budgets due to ongoing budget consolidations. As a result, domestic shipyards are losing a lot of money as government ship orders are reduced or even cancelled.

The British Royal Navy after the promulgation of the Strategic Defence and Security Review reached a new low in its size in October 2010 and is still under the sword of Damocles of budget cuts. The two carriers of the new Queen Elizabeth class are under construction, but only HMS Prince of Wales is likely to be permanently equipped with twelve F-35 JSFs. HMS Queen Elizabeth will be reduced to a state of obsolescence due to budget consolidation. extended readiness This effectively means that this new ship will be mothballed immediately. But we will have to wait and see: another white paper is expected in 2015 before the two carriers are completed. Although the modern Type 45-class ships will continue to be delivered and the Type 26-class ships are still in the planning phase, the navy, like the other branches of the armed forces, has to prove itself in the constant battle for budget funds.

The USA has cut new procurements such as the futuristic DDG-1000 Zumwalt down to three units - but not only for financial reasons - and is concentrating on the further development of the BMD programme, as already vividly illustrated by Frigate Captain Uhl. The current focus on the further development of the Arleigh Burke destroyers and the retention of the eleven carrier battle groups until the arrival of the Gerald R. Ford class meant that other smaller projects and a replacement for the ageing Ohio-class SSBN had to make way. Even the financially spoilt US military is therefore under pressure to save money under the leadership of the Democrats. And as a result of the budget sequestrationthe automatic budget cut in the US budget, the US economy is US Navy is currently in a state of financial emergency anyway.

The future of the French Marine Nationale results from the Hollande government's new White Paper April/2013. The navy is currently facing cutbacks in fleet activity, a new situation for the naval officers there. It will also be affected by the reduction in the overall strength of the French army and financial redeployment. Half of the patrol boats will be decommissioned and the construction of a fourth Mistral-class amphibious helicopter carrier will be cancelled. The number of platforms in the French Navy will therefore also reach a new low. However, the defence budget remains virtually untouched and the Level of Ambition, in French contrat opérationnelDespite a reduction, the debt ratio remains high. In view of the massive challenges that France is facing in the area of debt reduction, this new livre blanc for a strong military lobby in Paris. With French help, Brazil, the largest country in South America, will also advance its naval armament. By 2023, French technology and savoir-faire nuclear submarines and an associated naval base, catapulting Brazil into the minor league of nations with reactor-powered submarines in their fleets.

Overall, it can be stated that the domestic navies are becoming smaller and smaller, particularly in the West, due to cost-cutting pressures. Closer cooperation and task sharing would provide a remedy here in favour of consistent effectiveness.

A maritime century - wish or reality?

Although, to refer to the predictions mentioned at the beginning, it is quite possible that the 21st century will go down in history as the "century of the photon", the "century of women" and the "century of consciousness", it is also not unlikely that it will be a maritime century, i.e. a "century of the photon". Sea century  for Germany. Nevertheless, after only thirteen years, it is difficult to give a name to the 87 years to come. For the time being, however, shipping is becoming increasingly important. Both in economic terms and in the area of international security policy. Increasing economic interdependence, an increase in the exploitation of resources on the seabed and a growing number of offshore constructions will continue to drive the maritime sector forward, despite past setbacks. And this growing sector also requires increasing attention in the area of security policy. Be it the protection of trade routes, military access to centres of conflict as a deployment zone or humanitarian missions. Although there are cuts in state budgets, this is only the case in our latitudes and longitudes. In order to resolve this inequality, greater cooperation and task sharing, particularly within the EU, could be the solution to the problem. But this already seems to have been recognised. In South America, Russia and East Asia, on the other hand, the navies are being expanded and modernised nationally.

Finally, to answer the question of whether it is wishful thinking or reality to describe this century as a maritime century for Germany, we can refer to the ancient philosopher and Stoic Lucius Annaeus Seneca:

"If a captain doesn't know which shore to head for, then no wind is the right one."

The shore of a maritime century has been marked out. May the right wind now blow.

Lieutenant Captain Baumert is a member of Crew 7/04. Studied political science at the Helmut Schmidt University (HSU)/University of the Federal Armed Forces in Hamburg, was a navigation and press officer on board the frigate BREMEN and has been on board the French helicopter carrier DIXMUDE since the beginning of 2013.

Der Beitrag Das 21. Jahrhundert ist maritim - Teil III einer Aufsatzserie erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

The 21st century - a maritime century?
by OLt zS M.A. Kian Kottke and OLt zS M.Sc. Benedict Warkus

Introduction
Naturally, the maritime lobby in Germany, including the navy, defence companies and companies with a connection to seafaring, has a strong interest in highlighting the increasing relevance of the maritime sector for the economy, security, science and society as a whole. The DMI is also committed to this goal. The question posed in the title must also be considered against this background. Is it merely a wish, based essentially on a calculation of interests, or is it a justified, verifiable assumption about future developments? Firstly, however, it is necessary to clarify what is actually meant by the relatively vague term "maritime century". The extent to which the sea is gaining elementary importance for the various relevant areas of life in modern societies, in the sense of opportunities to increase security, knowledge and economic prosperity, but also as a risk factor for these very areas, should serve as a point of reference. These include maritime trade, which has contributed to a worldwide, albeit unevenly distributed, increase in prosperity in the course of globalisation, but is also particularly susceptible to disruption as a sensitive lifeline of the global economy; the use of the sea as a resource base, which has become an increasingly important component of the global economy, but which also entails incalculable environmental and security policy risks; symmetrical and asymmetrical conflicts and instabilities in coastal states also increasingly have a maritime dimension that neither states nor international law (let alone the German Basic Law) have adequately anticipated.
It is clear that the importance of the "maritime factor" should not be underestimated, even if this is not reflected in the political and public discourse in Germany. The question of whether and to what extent the coming decades will bring a significant increase in the relevance of the maritime sector for modern society will be addressed in the remainder of this essay. Firstly, the economic factors in particular will be considered, followed by the security policy risk factors.

Economic factors
The "freedom of the seas" is probably the most common catchphrase used to describe the importance of the sea for trade and prosperity in recent centuries. In the past, free trade routes opened up enormous opportunities for coastal states as well as landlocked countries, which benefited from the enormous turnover of goods by sea. It would make sense to list statistics at this point, but this would be tantamount to a truism and is therefore omitted. German import and export statistics are not the only evidence that the global economy is more interconnected today than ever before, not to mention the massive importance of free sea trade routes. The threat to free sea routes has a significant impact on the economic movement of goods, as can be seen in particular in the Horn of Africa, where not only state-led military operations, but now also private "security services" have to protect the right to free and peaceful use of the sea. Sooner or later, the associated cost increases will also affect the goods on offer in this country, meaning that the "freedom of the seas" has its price, which tends to rise.
However, this "freedom of the seas" is now just one of various factors that manifest the economic importance of the sea. The sea is no longer just a "transport route" but is increasingly becoming an economic asset in its own right. Fishing, which is subject to strict rules, at least in the EU, leads to lasting damage in other regions, e.g. off the West African coast, and thus to permanent damage to the sea as an economic asset. The "Deep Water Horizon" disaster also highlights the risks associated with the development of undersea raw material deposits. The importance of such raw material deposits has increased enormously in recent decades. Manganese deposits in large parts of the Pacific play a role here, as does the increasing development of gas and oil deposits. Due to climatic changes, it is now possible to develop previously unnoticed areas in the Arctic and Antarctic and to fully utilise them within a few years. This in turn raises the problem of which countries gain access to such deposits on the basis of which agreements - a question that now also has the potential for military conflict, for example in the dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands. The fact is that the economic importance of the sea is already enormous and will continue to grow. If war, according to Clausewitz, is the continuation of politics by military means, then economic factors will undoubtedly be the driving force behind politics in the long term. The sea will therefore not only become an "economic good" from which everyone wants to benefit, but also a strategic factor in the calculations of states.

Security policy factors
In economic terms, a steady increase in the importance of the maritime sector can therefore be expected. However, the vulnerability of modern and globalised societies to maritime threats is also increasing to the same extent.
Nation states around the world seem to have rediscovered the world's oceans as a place for power projection and power struggles. Geopolitics, actually a relic of the Cold War, is experiencing a renaissance and is leading to a maritime build-up in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, involving not only India and China, for example, but also numerous other coastal states from South East Asia and Oceania. In many cases, unresolved territorial disputes are the cause of the conflict. In reality, however, it is primarily submarine raw materials that are significant, the exploitation rights of which the states want to secure by asserting their territorial claims. The growing hunger for resources in developing societies will also increase their willingness to engage in conflict - and thus potentially weaken the security of the world's oceans. Brazil, the largest and most influential state in South America, is also expanding its maritime armed forces in order to emphasise its claims to the huge sources of raw materials off the coast and its position as a supra-regional power that projects as far as the Caribbean and West Africa.
In addition to traditional, symmetrical conflict structures, a variety of asymmetrical threats from primarily private actors that are difficult to assess have posed a potential for insecurity for both the use of the sea and the population on land that should not be underestimated in recent years. For example, in the form of piracy, which has made itself felt not only off Somalia, but also on the West African coast and in South-East Asia, or in the form of a diffuse terrorist threat that can be located in critical proximity to important maritime choke points for world trade (e.g. Bab el Mandeb, Suez Canal, Strait of Malacca). The supply of weapons by sea not only favours the conditions for proliferation, but is also capable of fuelling conflicts inland. It is not without reason that units from various Western states patrol the Lebanese coast. The smuggling of people and, above all, illegal drugs across the Mediterranean has also increased significantly in recent years, which has consequences for the internal policies of countries such as Italy and Spain, but also for the EU.
Almost 70% of the world's population lives relatively close to the sea and the influx into economically strong coastal regions continues unabated. Along with an increasingly complex conglomerate of conflicts and instabilities and the sharp decline in the willingness of Western populations (and politicians) to deploy their armed forces on land since the beginning of the last decade, there is a real need to prioritise the potential of maritime security in Germany and Europe. However, in times of omnipresent cuts in defence budgets, it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain a broad-based maritime force component. The utilisation of synergy effects and cooperation potential at European level could be a solution and would probably be easier for seafarers, who have always been accustomed to international connections, than for land forces.

Conclusion
Looking at the above, the current and future importance of the maritime sector can undoubtedly be recognised. It has also become clear that the sea already plays a special economic and strategic role in the calculations of almost every nation. Therefore, future challenges lie not only in the security of sea and trade routes and protection against piracy. It is undoubtedly of great importance that future maritime challenges are tackled jointly and across national borders. Only in this way can future territorial claims as well as access and mining rights be coordinated fairly under international law and for the benefit of all states. Such an approach is complex and cannot be realised within a few summit meetings. Rather, it requires a cross-national awareness of the existing challenges. And it is precisely in the development of this awareness and the resulting coordinated implementation of binding agreements under international law that the 21st century will become a maritime century. The sea is not only to be understood as an economic and strategic factor; rather, its importance has contributed and continues to contribute to connecting peoples with one another. This must be preserved in the future and it is up to us to shape this future.

OLt z.S. Warkus is a member of crew 7/06, studied political science at the Helmut-Schmidt-University (HSU)/University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg and is currently officer of the watch on board the minesweeper "Herten".
OLt z.S. Kottke. is a member of crew 7/07, also studied political science at the HSU Hamburg and is currently officer of the watch on board corvette "Ludwigshafen am Rhein".

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