"The fourth and final commissioning of the F125 class represents another important milestone for our squadron and the navy," explains the commander of the 4th Fighter Wing. frigate squadronCaptain Dirk Jacobus (53). "This is the first time that all four ships are under the responsibility of the navy. With the transfer of the last F125 to the navy, we are gaining an additional resource for the targeted training of all our crews," said the commander.

On the orders of the Deputy Inspector General of the Navy and Commander of the Fleet and Support Forces, Vice Admiral Frank Lenski (60) Frigate captain Stefan Rappelt (44), commander of the crew F125 "Charlie", put the frigate into service. "With the commissioning of the F125 "Charlie", the crew is bringing the Frigate "The "Rheinland-Pfalz" is the second of a total of four Class 125 ships to successfully enter service with the German Navy, thereby also completing the introduction and testing phase of this new class of ship," explains Frigate Captain Rappelt. "The crew is therefore delighted about this success for the German Navy and the upcoming tasks on board the Navy's newest ship," said the commander.

F125 - Frigate F 222 Baden-Württemberg. Photo: Michael Nitz

Already at the Frigate class F122, there was a "Rheinland-Pfalz" that made the federal state famous on the world's oceans. The close ties and lively sponsorship between the federal state of Rhineland-Palatinate and the crews of the ship will be revived with the commissioning of the new "Rheinland-Pfalz".

The "Rheinland-Pfalz" now completes the F125 squadron alongside the "Baden-Württemberg", "Nordrhein-Westphalen" and the "Sachsen-Anhalt". Frigate regardless of their home port for up to two years. Due to the high degree of automation, the personnel approach will be reduced compared to the previous Frigates by almost half. Its main task will be maritime surveillance in crisis regions and supporting special forces from the sea.

F125 - Frigate F 223 North Rhine-Westphalia. Photo: Michael Nitz

Good to know - More about the Baden-Württemberg-class frigate

With the Frigates of the Baden-Württemberg class, the navy will have a total of four of the world's technologically leading warships at its disposal. Designed from scratch, the Frigate type has been developed from the German operational experience of the past decades - and is designed for the present and future of stabilisation missions. The range of tasks of the F125 class primarily includes maritime surveillance in crisis regions worldwide, such as missions for embargo controls or anti-piracy operations.

F125 - Frigate F 224 Sachsen-Anhalt. Photo: Michael Nitz

The Baden-Württemberg class meets the requirement of being able to remain in operation globally and for long periods of time with new technical and organisational concepts: Designed for intensive use, it can operate for up to two years without being dependent on its home port, with 5,000 operating hours. As planned, the interval between inspections for the warships is five years and eight months. This almost doubles the operating time and quadruples the maintenance intervals compared to the previous system. Frigates of the navy. The reduced maintenance requirements, combined with automation and digitalisation on board the ships, make it possible to reduce the crew size from over 200 on the other frigates to 126 soldiers on those of the Baden-Württemberg class. Several 125-man crews will then take turns every four months during a longer deployment. In this multi-crew concept, eight crews are planned for the four Baden-Württemberg-class ships.

The frigates of the Baden-Württemberg class

F222 "Baden-Württemberg", put into service on 17 June 2019
F223 "North Rhine-Westphalia", put into service on 10 June 2020
F224 "Saxony-Anhalt", put into service on 17 May 2021
Frigate F225 "Rheinland-Pfalz", put into service on 13 July 2022

Technical data of the frigate "Rheinland-Pfalz"

Dimensions
149.5 m length (overall)
18.8 m width
5.4 m draught
7,200 tonnes displacement

Drive
Type CODLAG (combined diesel-electric and gas turbine drive)
1 x gas turbine
4 x diesel engine
2 x electric motor
1 x bow thruster
31,600 kW (43,000 horsepower) Total output
2 x propeller
Speed: more than 26 knots

Sensors
1 x multifunction radar TRS-3D/NR, range more than 250 km,
Target tracking capacity: more than 1,500
1 x EK system KORA 18 (electronic reconnaissance)
2 x video and infrared target tracking MSP 600
1 x 360-degree infrared monitoring SIMONE
1 x diver detection sonar
2 x navigation radar

Weapons
1 x main gun 127 mm Lightweight LCG, range more than 80 km
2 x machine gun 27 mm MLG light naval gun
5 x heavy machine gun 12.7 mm HITROLE N
2 x launchers for RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, range more than 220 km
2 x launchers for short-range air defence RIM-116 RAMRolling Airframe Missile
4 x decoy launcher MASS

Crew and miscellaneous
Regular crew: 126 servicemen and women
Additional personnel (e.g. for on-board helicopters, boarding teams): max. 70 servicemen and women
4 x Buster model rescue boat
2 x Sea Lynx Mk88A on-board helicopters (on board for use only)

Source of the technical data of the frigate "Rheinland-Pfalz" and more at bundeswehr.de

Der Beitrag Fregatte "Rheinland-Pfalz" als letzte der vier F125 in Dienst gestellt erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

It will be some time before the navy puts the ship into service. In the case of the type ship "Baden-Württemberg", it took seven weeks until the "complete requirements for the operability of the ship", as it is called in official German, were met. The systems and equipment on board the "Rheinland-Pfalz" are tested during the sea trials. This includes safety checks (e.g. on launching devices, on-board cranes, pressurisation system). The special requirements for IT and communications equipment that enable the ship to participate in the armed forces' communications network will also be established. Experience has shown that the time is also used to finalise remaining points from the construction contract.

Turning onto the home straight

The press releases issued by the Koblenz authorities and tkMS to mark the occasion also state that the first F 125 class ship is scheduled to be deployed from mid-2023. As long as earlier announcements regarding the current voyage of the frigate "Bayern" are still valid, a longer stay in the Indo-Pacific region may be on the cards. With Singapore as a support harbour. In addition: mast and sheet break.

That would be more than just an experiment. Functionally conceived as a 'navy', the project is a litmus test. Because the idea behind the F 125 frigate would be put to the test for the first time. The frigates of this class were built for the Intensive utilisation This means that they should be able to remain in their theatre of operations for up to two years in order to reduce long transit journeys (from home to the theatre of operations).

In the mid-2000s, the navy embarked on a new path with intensive utilisation, which also presented the industry with new challenges. This was because the various on-board systems had to be designed and constructed for long-term operation. According to thyssenkrupp Marine Systems, around 90 per cent of the systems on board the F125 were newly developed specifically for this type of ship. Compared to earlier units, the F125 frigates have a much higher degree of automation. In addition to the individual systems developed specifically for the F125, the approximately 28,000 installed measuring points contribute to this.

This means that the long-running saga over the F 125 class frigates is slowly coming to the home straight. Good for the navy. After all, the ships are urgently needed to relieve the fleet and crews. What's more, the navy needs the experience gained in routine operations before they are actually deployed. And not just as far as the ship is concerned. The multi-crew concept with the associated training facilities will also be 'experienced'.

Der Beitrag Fast vollbracht: letzte F 125 an Bundeswehr übergeben erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

In the navy, the current operational load with only a few units leads to disproportionate wear and tear. New units must therefore be commissioned on time and repairs must be streamlined. For example, the Spessart fuel supplier was unable to take part in the Standing NATO Maritime Group because repairs were delayed. The submarines spend too long in the shipyard. Adequate repair capacities in cooperation with industrial providers and the re-establishment of support facilities for the naval arsenal are required.

This is a condensed version and cannot adequately reflect the sweat and toil of the people who work on the operational readiness of ships and crews every day in all departments of the Navy and civilian agencies - another piece in the mosaic of the limited operational and material readiness of the Bundeswehr and the German Navy in particular. You can take almost any annual report from the defence commissioners of the last few years from the shelf and you will most likely find a variation of the facts described there, as shown here as an example from the Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces Hans-Peter Bartels from 2019:

The realisation of material maintenance projects for ships and boats to maintain operational capability is currently on a critical path. On the one hand, some shipyard layovers cannot be started as planned because the personnel resources of the naval arsenal (which is part of the Bundeswehr's armaments division) are inadequate. On the other hand, lay times in the shipyards are sometimes considerably longer. Typically, a large amount of damage, for example massive rusting, is only recognisable during the shipyard laytime. In addition, the lack of spare parts, but also deficiencies in the planning of repairs by the shipyards and other contractors as well as inadequate construction supervision by the Bundeswehr lead to further disruptions in order processing.

Let's consider a cross-check: what do our readers think would happen to a commercial shipping company if its merchant fleet were to experience this and be noticeably deprived of its intended purpose for years?

Let's not misunderstand each other: The picture is complex and cannot be explained by the dysfunctionality of a single department, office or organisation. The problem has been fundamentally recognised, countermeasures have been and are being taken and the process is constantly being scrutinised. And yet here we are.

If you talk to the people who are part of this system or at least dependent on it, certain patterns become apparent for which Armed Forces and the civilian bodies that support them are probably more vulnerable than other governmental or official areas due to their hierarchical organisation.

Over time, despite centralised control from above, an ecosystem with different areas of responsibility emerges in which a mentality develops in which people prefer to retreat to regulations instead of using existing discretionary powers - this also limits their sovereignty over their own regulations over time. At the same time, the "sovereignty" of one's own sphere of influence is closely guarded and compromises are seen as a zero-sum game in which one must not lose even the smallest metre of ground. Staff councils and equal opportunities officers also need to be involved on a regular basis. At the end of the day, everyone has always done everything right, the balance within the decision-making ecosystem has been maintained - but who has actually been helped? If, at the end of the day, the unity of the departments concerned - but not the solution to a problem - is on the credit side, this is de facto organised irresponsibility.

Part of the truth is that parts of the AIN organisational unit and its subordinate departments have become "reform-weary" after years of adjustments and restructuring. But is what has been achieved enough and is there enough time for a "breather"? Even with a view to the federal elections in September this year, the signs are more in favour of change than persistence in the status quo.

Does this phenomenon sound familiar to you? Parallels with the general state of the Federal Republic of Germany are not coincidental. Apparently, people could afford the conditions; in times of crisis, however, deficits are ruthlessly exposed. We read online at the Neue Züricher Zeitung in the article "The failure of the coronavirus administrators: Germany is suffocating under its bureaucracy":

But the personalised criticism does not explain the deeper, genuinely German problem. In this week's "Die Zeit", four authors attempted an alternative explanation. The reason for the growing doubts about state efficiency is "something bigger, systemic", they explained, describing it as a "diffusion of responsibilities" between the federal and state governments. If everyone is responsible, then no one is entirely.

[...] The real reason for Germany's failure in the crisis is a peculiarity that permeates all political levels of the country and has done so for a long time: it is the desire for bureaucracy. Before the pandemic, it was a source of jokes, advice texts and YouTube videos, especially abroad. Now, during the crisis, its destructive nature is becoming apparent.

[...] In recent years, it has often been said that Germany's reputation has suffered: due to faltering digitalisation, the many wireless gaps, overpriced and faulty major construction sites, unreliable railways, dilapidated infrastructure and so on. It seemed that the "made in Germany" seal of quality had lost its value. On closer inspection, however, it is not the makers who are failing, it is the administrators. [...] It is the German state that is damaging the country's reputation: instead of clearing problems out of the way, it sets up regulations that themselves become a problem. Made in Germany? Everything the state touches is "late in Germany".

So why should the German Navy be better off than the rest of the country? Let us remind ourselves at this point that regulations do not fall from the sky without motivation but are man-made and can be adapted or even withdrawn. Who or what is actually preventing the armed forces from demanding and implementing sensible exceptions to regulations where this can be justified for military use? And where civilian regulations are being replaced, from tightening their own rules in anticipatory obedience more tightly than was actually intended in the civilian version. One example, representative of many others, is the handling of the EU Working Time Directive, which is causing a great deal of frustration among units and crews, particularly in the navy. In addition to a lack of self-confidence in their own military needs, it is the non-use of existing privileges and exemptions that paralyses.

Der Beitrag Behördenstau? Zwischen Bürokratie und struktureller Lähmung erschien zuerst auf marineforum.