Why the Russian military is brutalising Ukraine
About resentment and betrayal
From Tom Nichols

War is always a brutal business, but why is the Russian military so determined to inflict civilian damage on neighbouring Ukraine? I spoke to another Russia expert.

Run amok
I spent years teaching military officers who served in conflicts around the world. I am not naive about the viciousness of war, and I am grateful that it has never befallen me. But I am appalled by the sheer sadism of Russia's war against Ukraine. Russia's armed forces are engaging in actions such as levelling cities, deliberate attacks on civilian targets and other obvious war crimes that we would associate with a war of annihilation.

I turned to a friend, also an expert on Russia, to question this more thoroughly. Nick Gvosdev has a Ph.D. in Russian history from the University of OxfordHe and I worked together for many years on the U.S. Naval War College taught. (He still teaches there, and his comments here are his personal views and not those of the US government). We are both Eastern Orthodox Christians ourselves, which adds a particularly painful aspect for us to this immense tragedy. We have had many conversations about the war, the latest of which I now offer to readers trying to understand this terrible conflict.

Tom Nichols: Nick, international relations experts will elaborate on the "great power" dimensions of this war, but why is the conflict so brutal at the level of actual fighting? Is it really enough to say that the Russians were merely reacting to the humiliation of defeat almost from the start?

Nick Gvosdev: To a certain extent. At all levels of Russian society, from the taxi driver on the street to the Kremlin insider, there was a strong belief that the Russian forces would be welcomed as liberators, especially in the Russian-speaking areas of Ukraine. In fact, the original Russian military plan was based on the assumption that Ukrainian soldiers would refuse to fight and Ukrainian politicians would defect. However, this was not the case. Even more strikingly, the two largest Russian-speaking cities in Ukraine - Kharkiv and Odessa - proved to be focal points for the successful defence against the Russian invasion.

Nichols: The last point seems to be important.

Gvosdev: Yes, Western Ukraine - at least those areas that were part of the Habsburg Empire and were never under Russian imperial rule - emphasised its difference from the Russians and was always the heartland of Ukrainian nationalism. But almost all the atrocities we have seen have been directed against people precisely in those parts of Ukraine that are part of the Russian-speaking world. There seems to be a strong undercurrent to give these "traitors" their due reward.

Nichols: I don't think this is fully understood in the West. The massacre in Bucha, for example, was directed against Russian-speaking people - almost as if they made the Russians more angry than Ukrainian nationalists.

BUKHA, UKRAINE - 06 Apr. 2022: War in Ukraine. Chaos and devastation on the streets of Bucha as a result of the attack by Russian invaders

Gvosdev: Bucha was certainly a particular target, as it served as a dormitory town for Ukrainian government employees and military officers. But this is all a direct result of the appropriation of a World War II narrative in which the Ukrainian government is routinely described as a Nazi regime and that those fighting against the Russians are fascists. Meanwhile, Russian social media routinely uses the term "Allied Forces" to describe the Russian military and the militias of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics - with all the World War II connotations that description carries. So think about it: If the Ukrainian military and government are the modern-day successors to the Nazis, then of course no quarter should be given to those who fight on the side of the fascists - and especially those who betrayed their relatives.

Nichols: What about the Russian military? Is there something in their training and background that makes them harder to control? They certainly haven't improved in their effectiveness as a fighting force since the Soviet days.

Gvosdev: Russia has tried to create a professional army of volunteers, but it still lives with the "traditions" from the Soviet era, including the brutalisation of its own recruits - the so-called "dedovshchina" - and a strictly hierarchical command structure. Add to this the ongoing problem of corruption within the military, and they create an ethos in which it is more advantageous to brutalise others than to be affected by it themselves. Another point: the Kremlin is keen to avoid general mobilisation, and so a number of Russian soldiers now fighting in Ukraine chose military service over prison - as the US did during the Vietnam War.

Nichols: I almost didn't believe it when I saw it.

Gvosdev: Worse still, the Russians also rely on mercenaries and militias, and this is another group in which people with criminal records can end up. In many cases, the atrocities were the result of some of these people being allowed to run amok - except that they were simply given general orders to punish "traitors" and eliminate "Nazis" without any special supervision or discipline from above.

Nichols: In contrast, Ukraine has found that a solid and reliable corps of NCOs works wonders in the field.

Gvosdev: Absolutely. Ukraine's military reforms to NATO standards in recent years have also enabled its military to carry out more decentralised operations.

Nichols: It seems that resentment is the strongest "force multiplier" in the Russian military: You betrayed us, you live better than us, you elected your own government, so ... you are Nazis, consequently we can do to you what we already did to them in World War II.

Gvosdev: This is the logical outcome - and how to move from "brothers and sisters" to all-out carnage. From the Russian point of view, Ukraine has turned its back on its brother Russia and driven a sword into the heart of the "Russian world" by trying to integrate into the Western world. Russian politicians and experts deal with these issues every day. This narrative of "betrayal" is linked to the general Russian resentment towards Europe and the West. Some of it is certainly related to living standards, but it is also driven by the feeling that Europeans - and now Ukrainians - look down on Russia as not quite European, definitely not Western and perhaps not even civilised. And this resentment leads to a Russian determination to let others share in Russia's misery, be it by bombing Ukraine or by triggering an energy and economic crisis in the rest of Europe. [Editor's note meerverstehen: And a worldwide famine.]

Nichols: I sense an unpleasant parallel here with events in the USA and some other countries.

Gvosdev: Dhe politics of resentment is always the gateway to legitimising anger and thoughtless rage - and ultimately violence - against those who are considered traitors or evildoers, as a justified reaction of those "looked down upon", so to speak. However, the Russians do not have a monopoly on this in the world.

Der Beitrag Ein Zwiegespräch: "Warum das russische Militär die Ukraine brutalisiert" erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

This is made clear by Russia's maritime blockade of the Ukrainian coast and harbour cities, including the dramatic developments surrounding the export of grain exports of global significance, the ongoing projection of a possible landing of Russian forces from the sea, the use of the Black Sea as an operation and launch area for Russian cruise missiles and the struggle for Snake Island.

It was against this background that we became aware in June when pictures emerged showing a Russian corvette of the Vasily Bykov class (project 22160) with a short-range tactical anti-aircraft missile system of the Tor-M2KM type strapped to the ship's flight deck.

The gate system used weighs around 15 tonnes and is operated by two men. It consists of a module including a radar and firing unit and can be operated independently of the ship's power supply and operations centre. It was striking that the module was kept in the dark olive colour of the land forces and that it was not visually adapted to its maritime environment.

The application is not in itself a sign of deficiency or structural incompetence - you are fighting with the equipment, capabilities and personnel you have, not the ones you would like to have. The fact is that the four active units of the Project 22160 class are equipped as standard with only one launcher for eight 9K338 Igla-S air-to-ground anti-aircraft missiles with a maximum range of around 6 kilometres. The Tor system increases the air defence capability against aircraft, helicopters, drones and missiles to around 15 kilometres with its eight missiles.

The question is rather how sustainable this improvised solution is and whether it actually fulfils its intended purpose. It is quite possible that the air defence system is subject to greater wear and tear in the maritime environment (salt content in water and air) than on land and therefore has to be serviced or even replaced more often, which in turn forces the patrol boat into port more often.

Screenshot of a Tor M2KM system on board the Russian frigate Admiral Grigorovich in October 2016. Source: Defence Blog on YouTube, 2017.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet will not have ordered such an improvisation lightly: Both sides have dealt and taken blows, although it should be noted that Ukraine, as a country without any significant surface forces - but with other maritime capabilities and presumably Western reconnaissance assistance - is clearly punching well above its weight class.

Ever since the sinking of the Russian guided missile cruiser Moskva in April 2022 by Ukrainian Neptune missiles and the permanent loss of Snake Island for Russia at the end of June, Moscow has taken seriously Kiev's maritime capabilities to challenge the Black Sea Fleet in the Black Sea with missiles, drones and its own reconnaissance and command and control assets.

You may also be interested in this article on the Ukraine conflict and the Black Sea:
Drift mines in the Black Sea

Der Beitrag Improvisation im Schwarzen Meer – Landsysteme im maritimen Einsatz erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

Die Marineoperationsschule (MOS) ist Bestandteil einer langen Marinetradition in der Seestadt Bremerhaven. Dieses Band hat auch die vielen Wendungen und Wirren der Geschichte unbeschadet überstanden. Aus der ursprünglich auf dem Gelände der Tecklenborg Werft errichteten Technikschule ist im Laufe der Zeit die zentrale Einrichtung für die operative und taktische Ausbildung der Deutschen Marine erwachsen. Seit 1997 existiert die MOS unter ihrem jetzigen Namen und hat sich durch die Integration der Fernmeldeschule und der Waffenschule sowie dem Aufbau des Taktikzentrums der Marine (TZM) aus der Seetaktischen Lehrgruppe zur Alma Mater der Operateure entwickelt.[ds_preview]

Vom Operateur zum Stab

Die Struktur der MOS folgt dem klassischen Schulaufbau mit einem Stab und drei spezialisierten Lehrgruppen, bietet aber gleichzeitig einige Besonderheiten. Die Lehrgruppe Ausbildung umfasst die Hauptfachbereiche Waffeneinsatz, Operationsdienst und Führungsunterstützung sowie Systemausbildung. Außerdem werden hier die Anteile der Ausbildungsunterstützung mit dem Schulbüro und der Ressourcenverwaltung des Integrierten Ausbildungsmanagementsystems (IAMS) abgebildet und durch den Sprachendienst des Bundessprachenamts als kooperativem Bestandteil ergänzt.

In der Lehrgruppe A ist mit Ausnahme der Grundausbildung der Mannschaften und Unteroffiziere die operative militärfachliche Ausbildung der Deutschen Marine gebündelt. Hier werden in vier Inspektionen überwiegend die für den Dienst im operativen Bereich vorgesehenen deutschen und internationalen Offiziere sowie Soldatinnen und Soldaten des Verwendungsbereichs 2 (VB 2) in einer mehrstufigen Ausbildung auf ihre zukünftigen maritimen Tätigkeiten an Bord oder an anderer Stelle in der Truppe vorbereitet. Darüber hinaus findet hier die technische Ausbildung der Instandhalter an Kritischen Ausbildungsmitteln der Marine (KrAM) statt, also an Ausbildungsmitteln, die marineweit nur einmal zur Verfügung stehen. Dies umfasst die EloKa- und Navigationsanlagen, -geräte und -systeme der Marine für alle Schiffs- und Bootsklassen sowie die Fernmeldesysteme der Korvetten 130 und der Fregatten 124. Abgerundet wird das Portfolio der Lehrgruppe A durch die Inspektion Systemausbildung am Standort Wilhelmshaven. Diese ist zuständig für Instandhalterausbildung an technischen Anlagen und Geräten bis hin zur Bedienerausbildung für seegehende Einheiten aller Fregatten und Korvetten sowie vereinzelte Trainings für Einsatzgruppenversorger und U-Boote. Darüber hinaus sind der MOS die zum Studium an der Jade Hochschule in Elsfleth sowie die als Lehrgangsteilnehmer des B-Lehrgangs Logistik an die Logistikschule der Bundeswehr in Osterholz-Scharmbeck versetzten Soldatinnen und Soldaten der Lehrgruppe A truppendienstlich unterstellt.

Die Lehrgruppe B ist in ihrem Ausbildungsauftrag breit gefächert. Neben der Grundausbildung und der einsatzlandunspezifischen Ausbildung (AP 2) erfolgen hier in zwei Inspektionen die militärfachliche Ausbildung der Mannschaften des VB 2 sowie die Ausbildung neuer marinespezifischer Module. Nach Abschluss der dreimonatigen Grundausbildung werden die Soldatinnen und Soldaten mit Einführung der Aufbaubefähigungen Bord und Land zusätzlich zur militärfachlichen Ausbildung zielgerichtet auf ihre späteren Verwendungen vorbereitet. Ebenfalls in dieser Lehrgruppe beheimatet ist eine Besonderheit der MOS: Die Inspektion Überleben auf See, mit der dazugehörigen, direkt innerhalb der Liegenschaft der MOS befindlichen Wasserrettungsübungshalle. Diese deutschlandweit einmalige Ausbildungseinrichtung ist für die Ausbildung der entsprechenden Inhalte aller Luftfahrzeugbesatzungen der Bundeswehr, aber auch der Bundes- und Landespolizei und internationaler Partner aus Österreich, Frankreich und der Schweiz sowie der Spezial- und spezialisierten Kräfte zuständig. Höhepunkt der Ausbildung ist das Training auf der Nordsee, bei dem mögliche Notfälle realitätsnah ausgebildet und geübt werden können.

Das Taktikzentrum der Marine (TZM) ist ein weiterer einzigartiger und integraler Bestandteil der MOS. Dabei handelt es sich um die zentrale Stelle für die Taktik- und Verfahrensausbildung. In dieser Funktion führt es Individualausbildung, Verfahrensausbildung in den Warfare Areas bis hin zu Taktik- und Fachseminaren im Bereich Operation und Recht sowie Einsatzvorbereitung und komplexe Planungsübungen für Stäbe und Operationen durch. Zur Durchführung der Aufgabe wird die MOS inhaltlich und personell eng verknüpft, um die Ausbildung auf höchstem Niveau gewährleisten zu können. Um die neuen Möglichkeiten der synthetischen Ausbildung wie dem Fleet Synthentic Training (FST) für die Einsatzausbildung der Flotte bestmöglich nutzen zu können, wurde 2017 die Gruppe Synthetische Ausbildung als Teilbereich des TZM aufgestellt. Neue Formate wie Monthly War, eine komplexe Übung der Teams aus den Operationszentralen der Flotte in den Traineranlagen der MOS, oder Southern Coasts, dem „synthetischen Bruder“ von der realen Übungsreihe Northern Coasts, wurden erfolgreich etabliert und von der Flotte gut angenommen.

Feuerlöschübung zur Aufbaubefähigung Bord, Foto: Bw

Mit dieser Struktur erfüllt die MOS ihren Kernauftrag, die Ausbildung von Soldatinnen und Soldaten aller Dienstgrade in allen Bereichen des Marineoperationsdienstes, getreu dem Motto: „Learn how to fight and win at sea!“ Sie stellt damit das Herz der operativen Ausbildung der Marine dar. Hier werden Menschen zu Operateuren ausgebildet, anschließend Operateure zu schlagkräftigen Teams und Teams zu Stäben. Die MOS ist aber mehr als nur die Alma Mater der Operateure. Sie bildet den Knotenpunkt der Operateure zur Herstellung eines gemeinsamen operativen Verständnisses. Die operative Aus- und Weiterbildung vom Individuum über schlagkräftige Teams zu erfolgreichen Stäben ist ein Prozess, durch den die Fähigkeiten des operativen Personals angepasst und verbessert werden. Dies resultiert in der Vertiefung von Kenntnissen, Fähigkeiten und Fertigkeiten in einem sich stetig verändernden operativen Umfeld. Das gemeinsame operative Verständnis über alle Warfare Areas hinweg ist eine essenzielle Voraussetzung für den Erfolg der Deutschen Marine. Es ermöglicht und unterstützt die Entwicklung und Verknüpfung der Individual- und Teamausbildung mit der Einsatzausbildung. Damit wird eine engmaschig notwendige Verzahnung aus lehrgangsgebundener Ausbildung und Einsatzausbildung – aus Schule und Flotte – verdeutlicht und umgesetzt.

Zukunft der MOS

Die Ausbildung in der Marine und insbesondere die operative Ausbildung an der MOS haben sich in den vergangenen Jahren kontinuierlich verändert und müssen sich einer stetigen Revision und Anpassung stellen. Dabei gilt es zu beachten, dass eine apodiktische Trennung zwischen lehrgangsgebundener Ausbildung und Einsatzausbildung im Bereich Operationsdienst nicht mehr möglich und auch nicht zeitgemäß ist. Flotte und Schule müssen näher zusammenrücken, um für die gemeinsamen Herausforderungen gewappnet zu sein. Ausbildungseinrichtungen müssen komplementär zueinander aufgestellt sein, um das zuvor aufgezeigte gemeinsame operative Verständnis bestmöglich und gemeinsam zu fördern. Dabei ist dem Faktor der personellen Ressource für die Ausbildung Rechnung zu tragen. Die Ausbildung ist immer komplexer geworden und benötigt enge Kooperationen, um resultierende Interdependenzen und Synergien nutzen zu können. Übergabepunkte und Zuständigkeiten müssen klar definiert werden. Die Einsatzbereitschaft der Marine beginnt in der Grundausbildung und endet beim voll zertifizierten Kriegsschiff oder Stab. Nur in diesem Verständnis können wir die vor uns liegenden Herausforderungen meistern.

Aber welche Entwicklungen beschäftigen die MOS? Mit der Neustrukturierung der Grundausbildung im Jahr 2020 ist in der Marine eine Abkehr von einer streitkräftegemeinsamen zu einer neuen marinespezifischen Ausbildungssystematik erfolgt, die Rekrutinnen und Rekruten durch eine Steigerung der körperlichen Leistungsfähigkeit und eine marinespezifische Ausbildung insbesondere auf die Anforderungen des Borddienstes in der Marine besser vorbereitet. Die Grundausbildung wurde dahingehend verschlankt, dass die Atemschutzgeräteträger- und Schadensabwehrausbildung aus der Grundausbildung herausgenommen wurden. Die daraus resultierende Zeit wurde für den Aufbau von Military Fitness, Sport, Waffenausbildungen und marinespezifischem Wissen umgeplant. Im Anschluss an die Grundausbildung dient die sechswöchige Aufbaubefähigung Bord dazu, die benötigten marinespezifischen Anteile Rettungsmittel, Atemschutzgeräteträger sowie Schadensabwehr und Schiffssicherung zu vermitteln. Durch die Aufbaubefähigung Land werden die zukünftig an Land eingesetzten Soldaten ebenfalls gezielter vorbereitet. Diese neue Ausbildungssystematik konnte durch die MOS bis Ende 2021 trotz pandemiebedingter Einschränkungen erfolgreich umgesetzt werden.

In der Offizierausbildung wurde der B-Lehrgang inhaltlich angepasst und findet zudem nicht mehr nur ein- sondern zweimal im Jahr statt. Damit wird die Regeneration der dringend benötigten B-wertigen Offiziere in der Flotte forciert. Neben der hierbei ebenfalls erfolgten Zusammenlegung der Lehrgänge von Offizieren des Truppendienstes und des militärfachlichen Dienstes zur Nutzung von Synergieeffekten aufgrund der unterschiedlichen Erfahrungshintergründe, sind „gemischte“ Hörsäle mittlerweile die Normalität. Die B-wertige Ausbildung wird aber auch weiterhin einer kontinuierlichen Anpassung unterliegen. Moderne Inhalte wie Crew Resource Management oder die regelmäßige Aus- und Weiterbildung der Ausbilder sind hierbei ebenso Bestandteil der Weiterentwicklung wie die direkte Einbindung der Lehrgangsteilnehmer und der sie aufnehmenden Verbände. Die Weiterentwicklung orientiert sich an einer detaillierten Auswertung der verfassten Lehrgangs- und Erfahrungsberichte. Oberste Prämisse ist und bleibt es, die Lehrgangsteilnehmer bestmöglich zu befähigen, alle taktisch-operativen Aufgaben in den Warfare Areas als Bootseinsatzoffizier (BEO), Operationsdienstoffizier (OPSO) und Principle Warfare Officer (PWO) und somit als Teamleiter auf Einheiten der Flotte wahrnehmen zu können. Die Neugestaltung des A-Lehrgangs wurde bereits zum Lehrgangsbeginn in diesem Frühjahr umgesetzt. Dabei wurden das Grundlagen- und das Warfare-Modul zu einem Lehrgang zusammengefasst, um mehr inhaltliche Flexibilität zu generieren und gleichzeitig mögliche Doppelungen zu minimieren.

Austauchen einer Luftfahrzeugbesatzung während der Hallenausbildung, Foto: Bw

Eine weitere gravierende Entwicklung der Ausbildung steht mit der Umstrukturierung des VB 2 – der zukünftigen Verwendungsreihe 25 – bevor. Die Zusammenlegung der Verwendungsreihen 23, 24, 27 und 28 zu einer Verwendungsreihe ist im Wesentlichen eine Reaktion auf die Herausforderungen der personellen Rekrutierung in diesen Fachrichtungen. Durch das durch die Personalgewinnung ins Leben gerufene Projekt versucht man, die Rekrutierung für den Operationsdienst zu verbessern und eine damit einhergehende Verwendungsbreite zu ermöglichen. Die MOS plant die Ausbildung zukünftig so aus, dass ein Grundlagenlehrgang Maat und ein weiterführender Grundlagenlehrgang Bootsmann mit je einer Länge von sechs Monaten durchgeführt werden können. Die Lehrgänge sollen jeweils zu Beginn eines jeden Quartals angeboten werden. Nach Abschluss der Lehrgänge werden Vertiefermodule wie Passivortung, U-Jagd, Mine Warfare und Eloka oder Zusatzlehrgänge angeboten. Die Anzahl der Durchführungen für diese Anteile wird in Abhängigkeit vom Bedarf ermittelt. Nicht zu verwechseln – und davon völlig unabhängig – wird es auch weiterhin typspezifische Systemausbildungen und Fachlehrgänge, beispielsweise für taktische Datenlinks, geben.

Aus technischer Sicht wird die Trainerlandschaft an der MOS aktuell einer umfassenden Modernisierung unterzogen. Noch ist die Fertigstellung des neuen Verfahrenstrainers nach mehreren Verzögerungen für Mitte dieses Jahres geplant. Damit wird für das laufende Jahr die sukzessive Wiederaufnahme des Regelbetriebs möglich werden und soll ab 2023 durch den vernetzten Betrieb als Szenario-Treiber im Übungsverbund ergänzt werden. Zur Komplettierung einer ganzheitlichen Ausbildung sind weitere Projekte zur Ermöglichung einer „Real-Time“-Vernetzung mit den Einheiten der Flotte notwendig.

Die Marineoperationsschule ist und bleibt das Herz der operativen Ausbildung. Einer strikten Trennung von lehrgangsgebundener Ausbildung, Einsatzausbildung und Taktikentwicklung kann nur gemeinsam durch das Zusammenrücken von Schule und Flotte im Geiste von „Wir sind Marine“ erfolgreich begegnet werden. Bei immer knapper werdenden personellen Ressourcen und gleichzeitig aufwachsenden Strukturen können die gesteckten Ziele nur durch die Bündelung der Kräfte in der Ausbildung erreicht werden. Der enge Schulterschluss der Akteure bildet dabei den Schlüssel zur Entwicklung eines gemeinsamen operativen Verständnisses einer erfolgreichen Marine. Die MOS entwickelt sich permanent weiter, um zusammen mit der Flotte den operativen Ausbildungsbedarf zu decken. Die Ausbildung von Menschen zu Operateuren darf sich in den Köpfen nicht auf das eigene Waffensystem oder die spezialisierte Warfare Areas beschränken. Vielmehr gilt es, die unterschiedlichen Expertisen in einem ganzheitlichen Ansatz zu vermitteln und ganzheitlich für die Marine zu nutzen. Die Marineoperationsschule ist und bleibt der richtige Ort dafür!

Fregattenkapitän Guido Stein ist Kommandeur Lehrgruppe B an der Marineoperationsschule.

Guido Stein

Der Beitrag Bündelung der Kräfte erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

The media image is dominated by the Russian combat vehicles deployed in a horseshoe shape around eastern Ukraine. [...] Is the current threat posed by Moscow enough to awaken Berlin from its slumber, or will it fall back into old patterns once the crisis is over? How can these security requirements for Germany and Europe be financed against the backdrop of an overstretched defence budget and a strained federal budget? And are these efforts organisationally and fiscally feasible in view of the dramatic demographic development?

In the upcoming budget preparation, Berlin will show how seriously it takes Moscow's sabre-rattling in eastern Ukraine and its own military and security policy capabilities. [...]Talking about what needs to be done now also reveals what has not been done in recent years.

Security is precaution - Commentary on the Russian-Ukrainian crisis. Blog #meerverstehen, 18/02/2022.

Less sparkling wine?

We now know more - including that Chancellor Olaf Scholz is planning a special fund of €100 billion for the Bundeswehr. We will find out what the special fund will ultimately look like in budgetary terms in mid-May, when the budget law is due to be passed by the Bundestag. What the politically organised "shopping list" of the dimensions (formerly the armed forces) will look like at the end of the day is currently an ongoing process in Berlin. Hans-Uwe Mergener has thankfully summarised the wishes and requirements that could arise from the perspective of the German Navy in a current contribution explained.

There is still a lot of water flowing through the Kiel Canal until the politicians decide and the industry delivers the ships and boats ordered. Until then, what is the status of the German Navy's existing and incoming units? We read about the two projects K 130 and F 125 in the 14th Armaments Report of the BMVg:

Corvette class 130, 2nd batch
Range of services

The Class 130 corvettes are a key component of the navy's crisis response operations. Their main tasks are reconnaissance of the surface situation and maritime target engagement. The operational spectrum ranges from peacetime presence and military crisis management tasks to combat in marginal seas and weapons effects on land. The project will be used to procure a further five Class 130 corvette boats.

Significant changes

Boats 6 to 8 are being fitted out in Hamburg. In terms of shipbuilding, the boats are on schedule. The twelve-month "design freeze" for the deployment system requested by the K 130 consortium in September 2020 was implemented in order to ensure the delivery of the boats and the deployment/operational support centre with full functionalities of the deployment system, combined with a delivery delay of two months for boats 6 and 7.

An intensification of the existing risks to the deployment system is possible. The contractual implementation of the delay through the integration of the new framework schedule into an amendment to the construction contract is still pending. In September 2021, the further procedure and the corresponding proposals for the technical solutions were presented as part of a project review. These are now being analysed in detail after the concepts presented in March 2021 for integrating the deployment system and mitigating possible delivery delays in the area of hardware were rejected by the contracting authority (öAG) due to unacceptable timelines.

Project overview

• Development measured against the first parliamentary referral:
  Deviation from the next milestone "start of delivery": +9 months in 2023
  Deviation from the current estimate: € +311 million (+13 per cent)
• Development measured against the current contractual situation:
  Deviation from the next milestone "start of delivery": +2 months in 2023
  Share of performance improvement/change in the above-mentioned deviation: +€191 million (+61 per cent)

Status & development of the project

The K 130 2nd lot project is currently on schedule and within budget in accordance with the contractual basis. The close working relationship between öAG and the K 130 consortium with on-site project management at the headquarters of the K 130 consortium is having a very positive effect on project management. Furthermore, there are signs of a delay due to a delay in performance on the part of the FüWES consortium (KoFü) as part of the integration of the deployment system. It will not be possible to specify this precisely until the end of the fourth quarter of 2021 at the earliest. The öAG's obligations to cooperate, including in the review and approval of the technical documentation, require considerable human resources, which can only be provided in a project-compatible manner with the help of external support. The centre of gravity of the project has now shifted from Lemwerder to Hamburg, with three of the five boats currently being equipped.

 Overall planning categorisation

The Class 130 corvettes are an important operational asset in the context of marginal sea warfare. They are used both to combat sea targets and to provide joint tactical fire support for forces ashore. The additional procurement of five corvettes will help to reduce the individual operational loads of all corvettes and subsequently of the navy. In addition, the greatest possible degree of structural uniformity will reduce the technical, personnel and organisational costs in the areas of training and infrastructure ashore.

In view of the current funding lines, the decision to procure a further five corvettes (boats 11-15 to ensure operational availability while at the same time utilising the first batch) cannot be financed for the time being. In order to fulfil the national ambition of a total of ten corvettes, options for achieving this are now being examined as part of an overall planning consideration, which at the same time do justice to the uninterrupted use of the design status of the current production line of the 2nd batch.

Defence & alliance policy aspects & developments

German naval forces protect the territorial integrity of Germany and its allies. The ability to act at sea is a prerequisite for engagement in crisis management by seagoing forces and for ensuring secure supply routes. In addition, the Class 130 corvette is a key component of the Bundeswehr's international crisis management.

Defence industry aspects & developments
The follow-up procurement K 130 2nd lot expands the Navy's capability portfolio in terms of quantity and, to a limited extent, quality as part of the elimination of obsolescence. By commissioning the K 130 2nd lot, the defence capabilities in national surface warship construction have been consolidated as part of the necessary renewal of the fleet.

Effects on operational readiness

The key to material operational readiness lies in the timely establishment of supply readiness and the implementation of all necessary measures for the accreditation of the IT systems of the entire K 130 class. Failure to establish supply readiness, i.e. permanently restricted logistical operability, will foreseeably have a negative impact on material operational readiness and, like the lack of or restricted accreditation of the IT systems, will significantly restrict the operational usability of the corvettes.

Frigate class 125
Range of services

The Class 125 frigate (F 125) is designed to meet the changing operational requirements of the present and the future. Among other things, the F 125 should be able to carry out worldwide and long-term missions. The main tasks are to carry out maritime stabilisation operations (low and medium intensity), provide tactical fire support from sea to shore, act against asymmetric threats at sea, provide command and control capability at commander level (Commander Task Group [CTG]) and support special forces operations or specialised forces.

Due to the required intensive utilisation (i.e. two years in service; 5,000 operating hours per year; worldwide deployment; operational maintenance period standard [BEPN] 68 months; implementation of a two-crew concept), the maintenance of the ship and the equipment, combined with the requirement for a small crew size, is of great importance and new technical concepts are therefore also required in the area of platform design.

Significant changes

The first ship, the frigate Baden-Württemberg (BWG), began its maintenance work on 6 April 2021 after its first phase of use. This ends on 26/08/2022.

The second ship, frigate North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), was commissioned on 10 June 2020 and ship three, frigate Saxony-Anhalt (SAH), on 17 May 2021.

The delivery date announced by the industry for the fourth and final ship, the frigate Rheinland-Pfalz (RHL), in mid-October 2021 had to be postponed due to the fact that the proofs of functionality had not been completed on several occasions. Delivery in December 2021 is primarily dependent on the fulfilment of the proofs of function, in particular the operational system, as well as a contractual agreement on services still owed and any remaining performance deficits.

Project overview

• Development measured against the first parliamentary referral:
  Deviation from the next "IOC" milestone: +70 months in 2021
  Deviation from the current estimate: + € 1.117 billion (+51 per cent)
• Development measured against the current contractual situation:
  Deviation from the next "IOC" milestone: +15 months in 2021
  Share of performance improvement/change in the above-mentioned deviation: + € 355 million (+32 per cent)

Status & development of the project

The delivery of ship 4, which is expected in December 2021, is highly risky due to outstanding evidence in the deployment system, the follow-up and rectification of all outstanding technical, commercial and contractual performance deficits as well as still outstanding contracts to establish operational readiness.

The scheduling, which is dominated by the block formation of measures, foreseeably reduces the possibilities of qualifying crews for deployment purposes.

 Overall planning categorisation

With the acceptance of the fourth and final ship, planned for this year, the capability build-up of the weapon system is progressing steadily. Due to the remaining limitations in the operational system and information security as well as the lack of operational testing (127mm artillery and missile firing), operational use will not be possible until 2023. From a planning perspective, the prompt elimination of these deficits has the highest priority in order to make the four units operationally available as quickly as possible.

Defence & alliance policy aspects & developments

Naval forces make a permanent contribution to maritime security in national and multinational organisations. The Class 125 frigate provides greater room for manoeuvre in terms of defence policy to counter crises and conflicts worldwide at their point of origin in order to prevent further escalation at an early stage. In addition, Germany is making an essential and visible contribution to the permanent NATO naval organisations with the F 125.

Defence industry aspects & developments

In addition to expanding the navy's range of capabilities, the F 125 offers the opportunity to demonstrate the technological capabilities of the German shipbuilding industry. Challenges exist for ship-based IT systems and their accreditation. The ongoing digitalisation of naval shipbuilding is creating a new development focus for the companies involved in the marketing of their products and their commercial success.

Effects on operational readiness

The key to material operational readiness lies in establishing supply readiness and implementing all necessary measures to accredit the IT systems of the Class 125 frigates. Failure to establish supply readiness, i.e. permanently restricted logistical operability, will foreseeably have a negative impact on material operational readiness and, like a lack of or restricted accreditation of the IT systems, will restrict the operational usability of the frigates.

Der Beitrag 14. Rüstungsbericht – K 130 & F 125 im Fokus erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

The Bundeswehr has a total of 71 main weapon systems. Their clear status, i.e. their availability for training and deployment, and the corresponding development of the figures are documented in the "Report on the material operational readiness of the Bundeswehr's main weapon systems II/2021". This includes twelve systems in the German Navy: In addition to the submarines, corvettes and frigates, the flying systems such as the Helicopter of the naval aviators. We read in the current report II/2021 for the past six months (extract):

The material readiness of all 71 main weapon systems stabilised overall in the reporting period and improved slightly in some areas. At an average of 77 per cent, it is slightly above the 76 per cent from the last report. Our target of 70 per cent average material readiness was exceeded by 38 major weapon systems, while eleven were below 50 per cent (including six legacy systems). The average material readiness of combat vehicles was 71 per cent, for naval combat units 72 per cent, for combat and transport aircraft 65 per cent, for all support vehicles (logistics, medical and CIR) 82 per cent and for helicopters still 40 per cent.

There are still erratic trends, a high degree of dispersion and a shortage of available stock for around a third of the systems. This primarily affects systems with small fleet sizes and "legacy systems" (e.g. the M3 amphibious floating bridge, the SEA KING helicopter or the P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, which will reach the end of its service life in 2025), but also the newly introduced weapon systems such as the NH90 helicopter or the A400M transport aircraft.

Clear stand Marine

In the past reporting period, as a result of postponed and extended shipyard layovers of units, deployments and similar obligations as well as numerous other orders had to be handled without reserves. The resulting strain on the available units leads to increased wear and tear above the technically designed utilisation profile of the ageing systems, which in the short and medium term leads to a further strain on material operational readiness and thus to an increase in maintenance requirements.

The operational scope of action of the Navy is severely limited due to the material availability of the units. This is due to the inadequate capacities of the MArs in maintenance management and the procurement office since 2019, even after the personnel of the Naval Arsenal (MArs) was increased by naval uniform wearers, as well as a still extremely tight spare parts situation. While this has already led to both a delayed start and considerable delays in the completion of shipyard laytime, further procurement law requirements, particularly in the run-up to scheduled shipyard laytime, are currently exacerbating the situation even more drastically in the reporting period. As a result, this development is leading to a decline in the operational availability of major weapon systems and, at the same time, to a considerable backlog of necessary maintenance requirements. Without corrective measures, the MArs can no longer fully fulfil its maintenance mission.

The implementation of medium-term maintenance planning has been impaired by considerable delays caused by the awarding of contracts. The procurement law problems already outlined in the last reports increasingly represent a critical burden not only for maintenance planning but also for deployment planning, which cannot be resolved by the Navy in terms of planning. The structurally precarious maintenance capacities (especially maintenance management and procurement capacities) of the MArs for the floating weapon systems will lead to massive slumps in the provision of deployable forces in the future, which may require prioritisation on the part of the BMVg with regard to the staffing of missions and comparable obligations of the Navy. In addition to the assessment of material operational readiness, it can be stated that currently less than 30 per cent of the afloat main weapon systems are fully operational - reflected in the capability-specific operational tasks for participation in high-intensity operations.

Outlook

The focus of the navy continues to be on balancing the influx of new major weapon systems with the necessary modernisation of existing units. The procurement of the Class 126 frigates and the supplementary procurement of the Class 130 corvettes, together with the renewal of the support units with the Class 707 fuel supply vessels and Class 424 fleet service boats, are key steps towards creating a modern and needs-based fleet. At the same time, however, it is also necessary to maintain the capabilities of the existing fleet in order to ensure the necessary operational availability for the deployment of current missions, operational obligations and prioritised projects/missions. Against this backdrop, the full operational readiness of the Class 125 frigates is of central importance.

[...] With the "Cornerstones for the Bundeswehr of the Future", studies were initiated in the reporting period on the establishment of "system houses" and the possible change in the performance of utilisation tasks, among other things. The Navy is focusing its considerations on the Systemhaus See (SysHSee) on the undivided and responsible assumption of implementation tasks in the IH, including the associated control competence both in the prioritisation of budget implementation and in the preparation of the MatErh financial requirements planning as well as constitutionally compliant procurement competence in the IH. From the Navy's perspective, this also includes the appropriate allocation of resources in the form of the integration of the naval arsenal (MArs) at both locations (Wilhelmshaven and Kiel), as the only service provider for the Navy from maintenance level (IHS) 3 or log level 2 in the sea dimension, into a SysHSee. In addition, the Navy sees the increase in weapon system expertise with a clear focus on contributions to the design and further development of weapon systems in all phases of the IPD/CPM as well as digitalisation as further key conceptual building blocks of SysHSee. The results of IPT 11 BeschO on the reorganisation of use must also be taken into account. The navy's contribution to the objectives of the Operational Readiness 2021 initiative was consistently continued during the reporting period.

The successfully established support of the BAAINBw, which has now also been institutionalised in the process for all branches of the armed forces by means of the processing of project-related topic packages from the BAAINBw by the military organisational areas, was also continued in the reporting period. Thanks to this support, numerous projects such as the supplementary procurement of the class 130 corvettes (K130 2nd batch) and the "Capability maintenance of sea-based signal reconnaissance of the class 424 fleet service boats" could be pursued in a targeted manner, for which the organisational basis or personnel capacities in the BAAINBw were not available to a sufficient extent.

Effects on deployment obligations

During the reporting period, the Navy was able to fulfil the BMVg's priorities and objectives with regard to deployments and mission-equivalent obligations. The navy is working at full capacity with the staffing of current deployments, mission-equivalent obligations and prioritised projects/missions as well as the exercise participation in the exercise series that are important for LV/BV in order to maintain capabilities. In this respect, the material operational readiness and the timely and comprehensive availability of the material/platforms are of mission-critical importance. The navy is already using all identified options to improve operational readiness ("Agenda Utilisation", "Immediate Operational Readiness Programme", "Multi-crew models", "Optimisation of training"). However, measures to improve the "operational readiness" of the Navy's floating and flying systems require a holistic approach across all organisational units, including the resources allocated to the military administration, which must be further intensified and pursued with overriding priority.

An impression

With a current material clarity level of 77 per cent, the overall figure for the Bundeswehr in the period under review is only one percentage point higher than the previous year. Even then, the BMVg had to admit that the pandemic had a measurable impact on this figure: Where training was cancelled due to the pandemic, less material was also worn out.

The report is not old, and yet it could already be politically outdated: The new Minister of Defence, Christine Lambrecht, has already put the "Cornerstones for the Bundeswehr of the Future" initiated by her predecessor on ice, including the examination of the list of "system houses" cited in the report. It cannot be ruled out that the minister will set her own priorities and make use of the available interim results - or not.

Der Beitrag Bericht zur materiellen Einsatzbereitschaft II/2021: Deutsche Marine erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

The NH90 is a transport and frigate helicopter developed jointly by France, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany. The cooperation partners procure nationally customised series variants. Germany is procuring 82 NH90 Light Transport Helicopters (LTH) based on the Tactical Transport Helicopter (TTH) variant for the army as well as 18 NH90 Naval Transport Helicopters (NTH) SEA LION and 31 NH90 Multi Role Frigate Helicopters (MRFH), each based on the Naval Frigate Helicopter (NFH) variant for the navy.

NTH Sea Lion

The NTH SEA LION will replace the SEA KING aircraft type from 2023 and will fully take over its tasks as an on-board helicopter for the navy's task force providers (EGV) as well as search and rescue (SAR) operations for the North Sea and Baltic Sea and maritime surveillance. The helicopter's successful maiden flight took place in December 2016. Delivery of the 18 NTH SEA LION aircraft is scheduled to take place between the end of 2019 and the end of 2022.

So far, eleven of a total of 18 NH90 NTH SEA LION (as at 31 October 2021) have been delivered. Due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the delivery of one aircraft has been postponed from 2021 to 2022, meaning that two more aircraft will be delivered in 2021 and the remaining five in 2022. The focus was and continues to be on stabilising flight operations in order to enable the next steps of operational testing and crew training in time to take over the SAR See task in 2023. The measures taken to improve the spare/replacement parts (ET/AT) situation and to provide technical support to the Navy are having an impact. A large proportion of the ground service equipment required for flight operations has been delivered to the navy.

Status & development of the project

Delivery of the first NH90 NTH SEA LION in the Step 1 configuration took place on 24 October 2019, with the navy commencing flight operations at the beginning of June 2020. The final construction status (Step 2 configuration) is still planned for early 2022 due to delays in qualification and integration in the avionics area. The upgrade from Step 1 to Step 2 is scheduled for the period 2022 to 2024. Delays in development, qualification and delivery must be avoided in order to ensure the uninterrupted fulfilment of tasks after the end of the SEA KING Mk41's service life in 2023. Initial flight operations have not yet been stabilised satisfactorily. The level of training of the aircraft crews is below expectations. The takeover of tasks from the SEA KING is basically guaranteed in 2023. Full operational readiness is unlikely to be achieved in individual task areas. The provision of a sufficient number of aircraft in the final configuration (Step 2) at the time of the takeover of tasks in the full operational spectrum of the SEA KING Mk41 aircraft type in 2023 is currently assessed as risky due to the conversion effort now required from Step 1 to Step 2. The primary goal is to take over the permanent SAR Sea mission in 2023.

Overall planning categorisation

The NH90 NTH SEA LION project replaces the SEA KING Mk41 and ensures the SAR capabilities at sea and use as an on-board helicopter for the EGV. Due to faulty documentation and a lack of tools and ground equipment, the helicopters were only put into flight operations by the Navy six months after the first helicopter was delivered to the BAAINBw. In the meantime, flight and training operations and operational testing are gradually but slowly getting underway. Mitigation measures using the legacy Mk41 system cannot be reliably mapped on a large scale due to declining crew numbers and the expiring technical and logistical basis.

Defence & alliance policy aspects

The unrestricted use of the sea must be ensured jointly by the Alliance and the Bundeswehr. This requires the ability to participate in the entire national and multinational operational spectrum of maritime forces. With the NH90 NTH SEA LION The performance of a wide range of tasks, particularly in the areas of SAR, support for special forces and surface warfare, is ensured both nationally and within the framework of alliance policy.

Defence industry aspects & developments

The NH90 NTH SEA LION programme contributes to the utilisation of national production capacities, while engineering capacities are utilised as part of the development work still required.

Effects on operational readiness

As part of the Navy's initial flight operations, the operational test for the NH90 NTH SEA LION weapon system is currently being carried out as part of integrated verification. The aim here is to master the many challenges of the new introduction in good time in order to ensure the seamless replacement of the SEA KING Mk41 and thus the SAR capability at sea, which requires a ready-to-use weapon system that has the required functional capabilities and sufficient material readiness to cover operational requirements. The NH90 NTH SEA LION will now have to prove this as part of the operational test. The mission-critical functions in the helicopter's specified target utilisation profile will be tested under near-mission conditions. In addition, all facets of the technical and logistical concept will be assessed for its operational suitability under the special conditions of the navy.

NH 90 MRFH

The contribution of the MRFH in the combat ship system network relates in particular to the ability to fight in the areas of underwater and surface warfare. In addition, the MRFH improves the capability for surveillance and reconnaissance of the sea area. The range of tasks also includes tactical air transport, boarding, casualty and patient transport, evacuation operations and logistical services in the context of disaster relief. Delivery is planned for the end of 2025 to the beginning of 2030. The MRFH will replace the SEA LYNX Mk88A aircraft type from 2026 and will be deployed as an on-board helicopter on the F124 and F125 frigates and, in future, also on the F126. To achieve full capability in accordance with the capability gap and functional requirement (FFF), an upgrade from Step 3 to Step 4 (Link 22/GPS M-Code) is planned at a later date. The Navy's initial capability (submarine and surface warfare) is scheduled to be achieved in 2027.

The Preliminary Design Review (PDR) for the NH90 MRFH was completed in September 2021. The immediately following Critical Design Review (CDR) is expected to be completed at the contractually agreed time in January 2022. It may be possible for the first flight of an MRFH to take place before May 2022.

Status & development of the project

The timely realisation of the project serves to ensure that the SEA LYNX Mk88A can take over the tasks of the on-board frigate helicopter as an underwater and surface warfare helicopter without interruption. The first NH90 MRFH is to be delivered at the end of 2025 and the remaining NH90 MRFHs by the beginning of 2030.

Overall planning categorisation

The NH90 MRFH project will replace the SEA LYNX Mk88A and will primarily take over the capabilities of organic anti-submarine warfare and surface warfare from the air in the combat ship system network for the Navy's frigates. The Navy's frigates conceptually envisage multi-role capable on-board helicopters as an integral part of the sensor and weapon chain. Without this so-called organic flying component - organic in the sense of being an integral part of the ship in training and operations - the combat value of a frigate is essentially weakened. It is not capable of asserting itself under submarine threat, as modern submarines have a clear range advantage over surface units, which is only reversed by an on-board helicopter in "remote/upstream deployment from on board with considerable radius extension of the ship". The procurement contract fulfils the navy's requirements as a successor to the SEA LYNX Mk88A, although important functionalities still need to be implemented shortly after delivery.

Defence & alliance policy aspects

The unrestricted use of the sea and its liaison routes must be ensured jointly by the Alliance and the Bundeswehr. This requires the ability to participate in the entire national and multinational operational spectrum of maritime forces. In addition to the capabilities listed in the range of services, the MRFH has a submarine-hunting capability, which is highly prioritised by NATO, and will thus strengthen Germany's position as a cooperation partner in the maritime domain.

Defence industry aspects & developments

The conclusion of contracts for a European model has positive effects on the utilisation of national production capacities and accompanying engineering capacities in the context of development services based on the basic European model of the helicopter.

Effects on operational readiness

Following the conclusion of the contract in November 2020, the NH90 MRFH project has reached important milestones in the realisation phase with the entry into the detailed specifications for technical development. The upcoming planning and preparations must now be consistently geared towards the goal of providing the future user with a ready-to-use product that largely covers the functional requirements and ensures a high level of operational readiness right from the start. The project work is therefore now focussing on the project elements that have a direct impact on the provision and future operation by the Navy as an on-board helicopter on the frigates, in order to ensure the timely replacement of the SEA LYNX Mk88 fleet and the seamless transfer of its tasks.

Der Beitrag 14. Rüstungsbericht – Marinehelikopter im Fokus erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

The key question of the first panel China is a Baltic Sea neighbour? was answered by the Ambassador of the Republic of Singapore to Germany, Mr Laurence Bay, in a reversal of the facts: Germany and the EU are neighbours of the South China Sea. He sees proof of this not only in the presence of European merchant ships in this sea area and in the numerous branches of European companies in this region, more than 2,000 in Singapore alone. The numerous initiatives, such as the connection to the Information Fusion Centre, to which European countries also send personnel, the joint activities against piracy and, ultimately, the availability of anti-Covid-19 vaccines, underpin his position. No physical borders were needed to be part of it. The Southeast Asian states are open to strengthening this cooperation.

This also applies to the marines. At the same time, the ambassador of the city state warned of the limits of such commitments. A strategic logjam should be avoided. Incidents that could lead to uncontrollable reactions were not in the interests of the neighbouring states. Peaceful solutions should be sought. His plea for German and European engagement in Southeast Asia ended with a reference to the fact that in December 2020, the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) expanded their relationship into a strategic partnership after almost 45 years of dialogue based on partnership.

The second part of the question Rethink strategic-operational planning! was the approach taken by Captain Sascha-Helge Rackwitz, Office Director of the Head of Department FüSK at the Federal Ministry of Defence, on the basis of the Indo-Pacific Guidelines. In summary, the answer to the question of a stronger maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific region is ultimately also about being a constant partner. However, we should be aware that as such we are also turning the balance screw. Which brought him back to Europe. If the Americans turn to Asia, then "we in Europe have to balance things out".

Change through trade?

In the second panel Dependencies, values & economic success: economic pressure to act? Hanna Müller, Head of Division at the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community, and Daniel Hosseus, Managing Director of the Central Association of German Seaport Operators (ZDS), crossed swords. The panel was moderated by Dr Sarah Kirchberger, Vice President of the German Maritime Institute. In their exchange, the schism in German positions on China became clear. Here, the sinologist, a long-time expert on the Middle Kingdom due to her activities in the country, presented her personal opinion and took a critical look at the risks posed by China. China is not a value partner, but rather a competitor and a systemic rival. Although Beijing openly faces up to systemic competition, from its point of view it questions the Western system as the rule of capital. In this respect, we remain more or less subtly exposed to threats - up to and including a hybrid threat to our basic democratic order.

On the other hand, companies are probably under too much pressure to succeed or do not seem to want to take note of what is going on around them. China should be integrated as a partner - "trade through change" as a principle that determines action. In an economy that sees itself as self-responsible, risk assessment is sacrificed to competitive pressure.

Some participants at the Maritime Convention may have asked themselves why this divergence exists. It seems that the political actors are not reaching the stakeholders. Is it because some create guidelines without explaining the rationale behind them to others? A better flow of information seems necessary. In the sense of classic military command, the intention of the superior should be better communicated - including better clarification of the methods and instruments used. On the other hand, it should also be noted that the political signals in Europe do not speak a clear language to those driving the economy and trade.

A conclusive answer to the key question - that is not the ultimate goal of the Maritime Convention. However, it did succeed once again in sharpening the picture of the situation by presenting contrasting points of view. It is to be hoped that these considerations will find a wider audience.

The situation of the German Navy

Just like the keynote speeches given by the Inspector of the Navy at the end. At the time of the Maritime Convention, he was in Paris at the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. An unintentional coincidence, as this is also about maritime security in the Indian Ocean, in which players from South East Asia are at least involved as observers. Rear Admiral Jürgen zur Mühlen, Commander of the Task Forces and Head of the Operations Department at the Naval Command, made the contribution.

Alongside many challenges, there is also good news for the inspector of the navy. After all, the navy is facing the most extensive renewal of its fleet in decades. The 25 million euro proposals for the acquisition of the U212CD, the successor to the P3C Orion, the F 126 frigate, the successor to the fuel supply vessels and the fleet service boats, as well as the extension of the service life of the F 123 frigate passed the parliamentary hurdle in June of this year. Important projects have thus been initiated. In future, the navy will require further modernisation for ESSM Block II, for the development of the F 127 frigate, for the replacement of the mine countermeasure units and the tenders/MUsE. He also had to consider the elimination of obsolescence or the replacement of the first batch of U212, the obsolescence of the F 124 frigate and the sea mine project.

Furthermore, the navy is facing really big problems. As on other occasions, the highest representative of the smallest branch of the armed forces is not afraid to address them publicly as such. Legal requirements that do not take its needs into account take away the navy's room for manoeuvre and place ever more hurdles in its way. Repair and procurement projects are delayed far too often. The fulfilment of the order (repair and procurement) within the agreed time frame does not seem possible (any longer) in the triangle of BAAINBw - industry - navy. The remaining units are fully occupied with the fulfilment of orders in the long term - training for high-intensity combat regularly fails due to the lack of usable gaps in the annual exercise and maintenance plan. It is essential for the navy that the start and end of the shipyard layovers take place as planned, on schedule and with the contractually agreed services. In the eyes of the inspector and his staff, this is a challenge for all parties involved. There is currently a lack of clear procedures, rules and management skills.

Footprint of the Navy

With regard to the new federal government, the course is currently uncertain. There are question marks over the size and financing of the armed forces. It is foreseeable that the pandemic will not remain without an impact on the defence budget. The Navy is trying to make its mark in the development of the coalition agreement. This involves the concretisation and further development of naval shipbuilding as a key technology. In order to increase operational readiness and accelerate procurement and maintenance, the navy wants to push ahead with the system house concept. Together with the other branches of the armed forces, efforts are being made to amend the Soldiers' Working Hours Ordinance (SAZV). The exceptions are to be extended in order to maintain operational readiness.

The inspector of the navy sees "real opportunities for the navy" in the key issues paper, even if it is no longer likely to be the central document due to the upcoming change of government. (Author's note: according to the information available here, the work will be continued in order to bring about decisions on how to proceed once the new federal government has been constituted). The inspector has issued audit mandates in his office. On the one hand, the command organisation is to be adapted in order to identify potential savings (fewer staff, more troops) and to become more effective operationally. Vice Admiral Schönbach can envisage separating the two commands (inspector-commander) into one organisation. He is also pursuing the establishment of a Maritime Warfare Centre and the idea of a Systemhaus See. According to the inspector, the latter in particular is a "thick plank", but initial considerations on the subject of a naval support command - arsenal are already underway.

As far as operational training is concerned, "the ability to fight" is to be emphasised more strongly. In order to create space for more deployment options and a higher operational tempo, the Navy has requested that fewer ships (with the exception of mine countermeasures units) be assigned to NATO units. With the intention of practising multidimensional naval warfare more intensively, opportunities for cooperation with other NATO partners, in particular "docking" with aircraft carrier groups, are being sought.

Helping hands

Turning to the current situation, the inspector emphasised that the navy continues to train, sail and fly even in times of Covid-19 and that all operational and operational training obligations are being met. DEUMARFOR has been established as a multinational command organisation (HRF (M)), the Initial Operational Capability has been certified and Building 15 has been taken over. Within "Operation Helping Hands", around 2,000 naval personnel will be permanently on standby and around 1,100 will be active in internal operations in the course of 2021. The plan is now to increase this figure by 1,040.

Geography matters

Referring to the Indo-Pacific voyage of the frigate "Bayern", the inspector referred to the threat perception in the region. Japan is concerned about the development of China's military budget, which has increased more than tenfold in the last 20 years. In perspective, the 355 Chinese naval units today would become 460 by 2030! Added to this are the provocations in the territorial waters and economic zones of other neighbouring states. In the estimation of many of the countries visited by the frigate "Bayern", Chinese means and intentions are steadily converging, creating a threat situation. Author's note: China's claim to world domination by 2050 has already been formulated.

With this final point, the Navy emphasises the position presented in the second panel by a ministry official, albeit as a personal viewpoint, that China is not only an important trading partner and strategic competitor for us, but also a growing hegemonic power that is pushing into Europe with power and money and putting pressure on the international order. An assessment of China's role that differs significantly from the public perception in Germany.

Annual report

It is a tradition of the Maritime Convention that the annual report of the Naval Command "Facts and Figures on the Maritime Dependency of the Federal Republic of Germany" is published. The annual report is being published for the 34th time. The 184 pages contain information on maritime security, global trade, the global merchant fleet and the German maritime economy. Figures, data and facts illustrate in writing and pictures why the sea is of crucial importance to all our lives. The report presents interrelationships "to make it clear why our country cannot avoid protecting its maritime interests," says the Inspector of the Navy.

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Der Beitrag Rückblick zur Maritime Convention 2021 erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

The election programmes of the two mainstream parties represented in the state parliament and the Wahl-O-Mat should help us with this! This is a digital comparison tool for the programmes and positions of the parties in state, federal and European elections. It is published by the Federal Agency for Civic Educationwhich is assigned to the Federal Ministry of the Interior.

According to the Wahl-O-Mat editorial team 24 parties that will be standing in the upcoming state election in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern on 26 September 2021 have answered the theses. Citizens then have the choice to rate each thesis as "agree", "neutral" or "disagree", or to skip the thesis completely and not include it in the final assessment. Finally, you can assign a double weighting to individual theses if they are particularly important to you. Overall, the Wahl-O-Mat for the state election in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 38 theses. Finally, you can select the parties with which you would like to compare your results on the theses.

As always, it is important to bear this in mind when using it: "A high level of agreement between your answers and several parties does not necessarily mean that these parties are close in terms of content."

How maritime is the election in MV?
Or rather, how strongly are theses with direct or indirect maritime significance represented in the parties' programmes? The following questions came to our attention when sifting through the 38 opinion theses that have a maritime significance in the narrow or broadest sense:

Thesis No. 1 - "The expansion of onshore wind power is to be accelerated in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern."

Thesis No. 08 - "The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline should be allowed to go into operation as planned."

Thesis No. 37 - "The state should continue to provide guarantees for the MV shipyards."

Thesis No. 38 - "The rewetting of drained moors in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is to be accelerated."

An overview with the responses of the 24 parties to the Wahl-O-Mat theses can be found here as a PDF.

What do the parties say?
We have taken a look at the election programmes of the two main parties represented in the state parliament and would like to present the key maritime content here:

From the SPD's state election programme for MV 2021

Industrial policy
The maritime industry has a special tradition in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Shipbuilding is part of the industrial core of our state. The shipyards and their suppliers are under increased pressure to modernise on the global markets. We will support the companies in specialising and developing new innovations. The maritime industry only has a future if it is willing to change. The SPD is clearly behind the shipyards, the maritime industry and the jobs available there. Thousands of people find work not only in the six shipyards, but also in the hundreds of suppliers and service companies in the maritime industry. Here too, however, we are working towards a socio-ecological reorganisation and thus towards the future viability of the industry; in favour of environmentally friendly technologies and fair working conditions! The locations of Rostock, Wismar, Stralsund and Mukran, for example, show how structural change can succeed in conjunction with the intelligent development of harbour areas and the establishment of new industrial companies on the quayside. We expressly support this approach.

 Transport
The logistics industry is an important economic sector in our country - and it is also an important component of mobility. This includes our strong harbours, which remain and belong in public hands in the long term as a public service. We want to position our efficient ports even better, establish new pillars such as the energy industry and, in particular, strengthen the traditional links between our ports and Scandinavia and Eurasia, especially the Baltic states and Russia, and place them at the centre of the search for new (old) transport routes. This also includes stabilising and further expanding traffic on the New Silk Road, which leads from China via Russian ports to Rostock and Sassnitz-Mukran and back. We will continue to improve transport links, particularly to the major ports of Rostock, Stralsund, Sassnitz-Mukran and Wismar. And we will actively support the logistics sector in switching to sustainable and climate-friendly drive concepts for vehicle fleets. This starts with shore power connections for ships through to the refuelling infrastructure for hydrogen trucks. The future completion of the Fehmarn-Belt fixed link offers opportunities in the western part of the state to connect to newly emerging logistics chains there and to enable value creation along the future route, but for the state's ports, especially in Wismar and Rostock, this will also change the competitive situation in the Baltic Sea region. This must take place under fair competitive conditions between private ferry services to Scandinavia and the Fehmarn-Belt crossing, which is partly supported by public law. There must be no state-subsidised tariffs for the new crossing that distort competition. The state will support the ports in their legitimate defence of their interests with the competition authorities in Brussels. At the same time, we will advocate improving the attractiveness of the railway lines in MV for freight transport as part of the creation of the Fehmarn-Belt link. This requires the construction of sufficiently long passing tracks and the provision of diversionary routes. This requires the support of the federal government.

 [...] In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, air transport is an infrastructural task for longer distances within Germany and Europe. An adequate range of flights is important both for the further development of the tourist region and for the business and science location. The regional airport Rostock-Laage serves this purpose for the centrally located parts of the state, which is why it also has a state-wide significance. With its central location within the state, it can fulfil the aforementioned tasks in a central location. In addition, it has gained significant importance for the cruise business of the Port of Rostock, and together with the Port of Rostock (Port Rostock) and Deutsche Bahn, we want to increase the attractiveness of the arrival and return journey by rail for cruise tourists from Germany.

 Angling and fishing
Coastal and inland fishing should continue to characterise our country. We cannot imagine our harbour locations without the "cultural asset of the fishing boat". There is a high risk for the future of Sassnitz/Mukran as a processing location due to Brexit and permanently low Baltic Sea herring catch quotas. A further reduction in catch quotas in the western Baltic Sea, particularly for herring and cod, will lead to the abandonment of traditional cutter and coastal fishing in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern or to disorganised, ineffective structural change. Together with the industry, we will develop a future programme for coastal fishing. We will develop sites for marine projects for sustainable, environmentally friendly aquaculture. The state has set significant milestones in this traditional sector for Mecklenburg-Vorpommern by leasing state waters to inland fishermen and anglers on a long-term basis, supporting applied fisheries research and establishing aquaculture companies. Together with the members of the State Anglers' Association, the former State Fisheries Association and the environmental organisations, we have found workable compromises to resolve the conflicts between the interests of anglers and fishermen (value creation from healthy fish stocks) and environmental interests (protection of fish-eaters such as grey seals and cormorants).

 Energy
In the mobility sector, we will see a mix of drive technologies and energy sources in the future. Battery-electric drives will form the core of mobility as the most efficient form. For this, we need an efficient and comprehensive charging infrastructure. Hydrogen and hydrogen-based technologies will play an important role, especially in heavy goods transport, agriculture, overseas and air transport. The refuelling infrastructure for hydrogen vehicles with fuel cells must be expanded across the board.

We want to significantly advance the topic of hydrogen in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Hydrogen electrolysis must take place in the vicinity of energy generation, but also there, where the heat generated can be utilised. We need networked thinking, for example. a hydrogen harbour in Rostock, which supplies the electricity from a hydrogen test field off Warnemünde utilises and becomes home to industries that require heat for their processes.

Europe
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern also owes its positive development since German reunification to the European Union and its stability, the common market and the European structural funds. Projects in the fields of education, business, tourism, infrastructure, social affairs, the environment and nature conservation have been supported in our state with the help of funding totalling many billions of euros. Our regional economy is closely networked in the Baltic Sea region. Many of our companies and jobs benefit from the European Economic Area.

[...] The direct impact of European Union decisions on life and the economy in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern also necessitates even greater involvement in Brussels. We will therefore initiate our own political initiatives at European level and bundle the responsibilities and competences that have so far been distributed among the ministries. Europe must and will move to the centre of the political field of vision with us. A partnership that goes beyond trade connects us with all countries in the European Baltic Sea region, but especially with our direct neighbour Poland.

[...] However, our Europe is bigger than our immediate neighbourhood and the European Union. We continue to focus on dialogue with the Russian state and cooperation with Russian civil society and business. For us, this also includes energy and climate protection partnership. In our view, this requires that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which has been authorised under the rule of law, is not allowed to become a pawn of geopolitical interests. We consider alternatives such as the planned gas terminal for American fracked gas in Brunsbüttel, as advocated by political competitors, to be significantly worse in terms of climate policy. In future, the European gas pipeline network will be indispensable for transporting hydrogen produced from renewable sources. Countries such as Russia with huge areas and potential for renewable energies will contribute to Europe's energy supply.

From the CDU's state election programme for MV 2021

Broaden the scope of foreign trade!
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is currently too one-sidedly focussed on Russia. As Russia has been losing importance as a sales market for products from Mecklenburg-Vorpommern for years, the state needs a foreign trade strategy that focusses more on growth markets, especially those that are in the EU and therefore in a community of values and law. Poland and the Scandinavian countries in particular, but also all other countries bordering the Baltic Sea, are important trading partners.

The Bundeswehr is part of our country
Its soldiers and civilian employees clearly belong to our state. We are emphatically committed to Mecklenburg-Vorpommern as a Bundeswehr location! Every single base is an indispensable part of our towns and communities. The soldiers perform an important, physically and mentally demanding service for our state! In addition to military operations, the Bundeswehr is an efficient, reliable partner when it comes to dealing with major emergencies. The Bundeswehr must remain part of our society; public pledges are an element of this self-image.

 Fishing is a tradition
Hardly anything emphasises the tension between humans, the environment, climate and species conservation as clearly as fishing. The romantic image of the fisherman on his boat has been overtaken by the harsh reality. Our remaining Baltic Sea fishermen, as well as inland and coastal fishermen, need alternative sources of income. Traditional shipping as a maritime heritage must not be lost. We owe it to our fishermen and women to stand by their side.

Shipyards are an industrial tradition
They form our industrial centres, and at the same time they are employers of well-paid, highly qualified workers. There are therefore no nostalgic reasons for preserving the shipyards: The shipyards and their suppliers are the last remaining link in a value chain that is of great economic importance to our country.

Der Beitrag Maritimer Faktencheck – Landtagswahl Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 2021 erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

The question arises as to whether the system of government needs to be fundamentally adapted. Do we again need a constitutional reform commission of enquiry, as in the 1970s, to draw up recommendations for such a reform on a broad parliamentary and social basis?

We have summarised some of the most pressing questions in the event that politicians dare to engage in such fundamental considerations after the election.

Foreign policy

• Where has Germany moved in the alliances since 1990? Does "never again war" still apply, supplemented by "never again alone", or to put it another way:
• Is Germany still firmly part of the Western alliance, or has it become somewhat detached from it and manoeuvred into a triangle between the West, China and Russia?
• And in this context: what is a fundamental assessment of the relationship with China in view of its changed policy under Xi Jinping?
• How does Germany see its role with regard to its eastern partners? Is it the backbone of Europe's conventional defence capability or does it see itself primarily as a mediator between the West and Russia, which relies equally on understanding for both sides?
• How does Germany position itself in the debate on so-called European autonomy in security and defence policy? Does it understand this to mean a strengthened European pillar of NATO that is capable of small and medium-sized operations without the USA if necessary, or is it primarily about autonomy from the USA?
• Is Germany prepared to formulate and publish a national security strategy?

Europe and the economy

• Does Germany see itself, as in the past, as the spokesperson for the market-liberal states of the EU, geared towards resolving contentious issues bilaterally in advance with France as the representative of a more statist group in order to jointly represent the result in the EU?
• Or is it orientating itself towards a middle position, knowing that after the UK's departure it will be the only major country in the liberal economic group and will therefore no longer be able to assert its former positions?
• This leads directly to the question of whether Germany will continue to insist on a stability-orientated financial policy within the EU, or whether it will accommodate the desire of the southern members in particular to pursue a softer euro policy?
• Will Germany continue to rely on its export strength, which is very much based on moderate production costs at home and is constantly criticised by less export-strong partners, or is there room for adjustment?

Security and armed forces

• Do we create a national crisis centre with decision-making powers that can decide and act quickly in challenging situations such as those mentioned above?
• Is the constitutional basis still sufficient for appropriate participation in the alliance? Can we live with the fact that Russia and China have a de facto right of veto over our foreign policy in the United Nations Security Council?
• Are we prepared to learn from Bundeswehr deployments abroad and to conduct an open security policy debate to this end?
• What needs to be done to adapt the structure of the armed forces in such a way that procurement and operations are once again possible in cooperation between the armed forces and the administration?

The open handling of military issues will be an initial litmus test of the extent to which the next Federal Government is prepared to tackle security issues in a fundamentally different way to its predecessor or whether it will retain its usual method of moderating such uncomfortable debates.

Der Beitrag Fragen an die deutsche Sicherheitspolitik erschien zuerst auf marineforum.

Enough time has now passed to be able to draw a reliable conclusion. And let's put it this way, the results are mixed. Not infrequently, the implementation of PPPs has not led to any noticeable added value for the user, often at increased financial expense. Overall, it can be said that it is important to carefully weigh up whether it is desirable to swap a leaner service at a correspondingly lower price, often with a simultaneous loss of military expertise and skills among personnel, which may end up being more expensive in order to compensate for the losses and deficits incurred.

The navy & the tugs
The fact is that the German Navy deploys several tugs for its own maritime operations, which in turn perform other tasks for the Navy and the Bundeswehr, or have specific expertise that is not available at will. In April 2021, Liberal MP Christian Sauter, a member of the Defence Committee, put this question to the German government:

How will the complete elimination of the company's own towing capability in the coastal area of the Baltic Sea, which is to be expected due to the advanced age of the commercially available tugs used, be handled? preventsand how can the navy ensure the fleet's mobility self-sufficiency at short notice, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, while at the same time urgently guaranteeing the safety of key technology (see White Paper on submarines, p. 57 ff.) and its professional handling through towing services?

In the reply from Parliamentary State Secretary Thomas Silberhorn dated 26 April 2021, you can read

The Bundeswehr operates one class 720 salvage tug, two class 722 ocean-going tugs, six class 725 harbour tugs and seven class 945 and 946 launches, which, among other things, provide the capability for towing and salvaging on the high seas as well as towing, towing and assisting in coastal areas in both the Baltic Sea and the North Sea. These tugs will reach the end of their planned service life from 2025; an adjustment of the service life is possible. The project "Maintaining the towing, manoeuvring and manoeuvring capability for seagoing units" was initiated in 2020 with the aim of maintaining the capabilities provided by these tugs without interruption. In principle, the capability can be provided using existing and commercially available technologies. Various types of service provision are conceivable for this. For this reason, the project is currently analysing the economic viability of all potential variants with the aim of meeting demand in good time from 2025. On this basis, a decision will have to be made as to how the necessary capacity can be maintained without interruption at the end of the service life of the salvage, deep-sea and harbour tugs and barges. Meanwhile, the towing tasks required to ensure the fleet's self-sufficiency in terms of mobility are generally performed by the navy's own towing units. In addition to towing and providing the necessary towing support for berthing and casting off manoeuvres in the port area, this also includes escorting naval units (including submarines) through the Kiel Canal. Furthermore, additional navy requirements for the Kiel area, the western Baltic Sea and neighbouring ports as well as in Wilhelmshaven can be provided by civilian service providers. Corresponding framework agreements have been concluded for this purpose, which in principle enable the provision of services in line with requirements.

One comment
The BMVg's answer to MP Sauter is the usual meagre one. In the German Navy, ancient tugs are in service whose licences and service life will soon expire. But it's not just towing, which is often overlooked: in addition to towing, bowing and securing, there are also roadstead shuttles, diver support, target towing (with evaluation) and survival-at-sea training for all (!) Bundeswehr pilots. So if the Wangerooge is decommissioned, at some point no air force pilot will be allowed to fly over the sea. So this is not an exclusive naval capability.

Tugboats have always been given lower priority. Most of them are almost commercially available, are operated by federal seamen and are at our disposal 24/7. The crews are safety-checked, instructed in military navigation, can carry out shooting analyses and much more. In any case, the BRH believes that outsourcing is also possible. Commanders regularly experience at bases, especially during delicate manoeuvres, that the naval tug always comes and you don't have to explain anything to them.

Example: If the HFG F 1 ("seals") are being towed, you need to know exactly how to moor and how fast you can go. Also that such a thing could be magnetised. A Bugsier employee (wherever he comes from) usually doesn't know that.

At the end of the day, it's always the same arguments and little changes - the German shipyards desperately need orders and the BMVg is talking about a "break-free" replacement.

Der Beitrag Private Public Partnerships – zu welchem Preis? erschien zuerst auf marineforum.